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L Introduction
[T]he worst thing we can do is weaken the incentives to be the successful
frog.'
Antitrust law, the protector of frogs and other competitors in the American pond,
has long been a storied feature of our culture. Since its inception in 1890, this
"characteristically American" institution2 has undergone a considerable evolution,
ebbing and flowing through banner years of exuberant enforcement and milder times
of reticent retreat. Although antitrust law has declined from its most popular period,3
it has retaken center stage in recent years largely because of the regulatory woes
plaguing Microsoft,4 which has been caught up in antitrust allegations for more than
ten years The intense publicity surrounding Microsoft's dilemma, coupled with the
past decade's remarkable merger wave, has illuminated numerous important antitrust
issues, including: the continued vitality of the antitrust regulatory framework; the
impact of changing political forces on current prosecutorial trends; the difficulties
presented by deregulation, worldwide competition, and a high-technology commercial
environment; and the future of antitrust law in light of all these factors. Accordingly,
the new millennium provides an exciting context for examining this quintessential
American doctrine.7 Just how will antitrust law regulate competitive frogs in this
1. Russ Mitchell & Marianne Lavelle, Road Runner v. Coyote: As Microsoft Case Shows, Markets
Move Faster than Justice, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 15, 1997, at 58, 59 (quoting William F.
Baxter, the Assistant Attorney General who was instrumental in the AT&T investigation and the IBM
dismissal).
2. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 195 (1965) (describing the political and social movement
driving the Sherman Act as "characteristically American"); see also Gary Minda, Antitrust at Centurys
End, 48 SMU L. REv. 1749, 1757 (1995) ("Antitrust, after all, has been a peculiar American institution
which historically has been as American as 'apple pie' and the 'fourth of July.").
3. See Minda, supra note 2, at 1755 (noting that "antitrust law peaked during the Warren Court era
and has steadily declined ever since").
4. The Microsoft case is widely considered to be the most significant antitrust litigation since the
IBM and AT&T cases. See Albert A. Foer, The Importance of the Microsoft Case, 31 CONN. L. REv.
1275, 1284 n.23 (1999) (stating that the Microsoft case has given antitrust "a salience not achieved since
the AT&T breakup and possibly since the election of 1912"); Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak,
Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1189 (1999) (calling the Microsoft litigation "the most
consequential antitrust case prosecuted by the federal government since the IBM and AT&T cases");
Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divewtiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REv.
1, 99 (2001) (calling Microsoft "the U.S. govemment's most significant monopolization case since the
breakup of the Bell System in 1982 and the first major antitrust case concerning the 'New Economy'
created by the phenomenal growth of the Internet"); Richard M. Steuer, Browsing the Microsoft Case,
13 ANTITRuST 5 (Summer 1999) ("Whatever one thinks of the Microsoft case, it has enlivened popular
interest in antitrust law like nothing else.").
5. In 1990, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began investigating Microsoft. See infra note 211
and accompanying text.
6. Richard G. Parker & David A. Balto, The Merger Wave: Trends in Merger Enforcement and
Litigation, 55 Bus. LAW. 351,351 (1999) (stating the "United States is in the midst of an unprecedented
merger wave").
7. Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and
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unusually challenging era?
At its core, antitrust law presents a rather basic concept, although its contours are
undoubtedly elusive. Antitrust is all about competition; it is primarily concerned
with cartels and with the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power by
impermissible means The statutory structure is somewhat sparse,"0 leaving the
construction of competition protection to government regulation and judicial
interpretation. As a result, antitrust law has been a fluid - and often controver-
sial - concept since its birth in the late nineteenth century's industrial age. Its
substantive application has shifted radically over time due to changes in the economy,
the political climate, popular views of "big business," and developments in economic
theory.
The highly publicized battle between Microsoft and the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice sharply focused public attention on antitrust law, a sleepy
substantive area that had been dormant for years. In the 1980s, antitrust enforcement
was uncontroversial because it largely disappeared;" some even speculated that
competition no longer needed protection. In stark contrast, the past ten years
witnessed antitrust's resuscitation. Regulators have begun looking upon antitrust
targets with renewed interest; at the same time, innovative technologies in the so-
called "new economy""2 are arguably rendering traditional competition regulation
obsolete. Microsoft's antitrust woes have personalized and heightened the arguments
concerning the vitality of current antitrust regulations in the modem high-tech
landscape. The protracted "big case" nature of the Microsoft litigation only
underscores these regulatory concerns. Today, with a new President and new policies
finally in place, 3 significant changes may be in the works. Antitrust law has taken
Intellectual Property, 68 ATrrRusT L.J. 913, 913 (2001) (noting "wide agreement that the last decade
or so has presented an unusually lively and challenging period for antitrust analysis"). Robert Pitofsky
is chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.
8. Judge Bork once eloquently described the elusive nature of antitrust law in the following
fashion:
Improbable as the statement may seem, antitrust today is almost an unknown policy. It
is ubiquitous: Antitrust constitutes one of the most elaborate deployments of governmental
force in areas of life still thought committed primarily to private choice and initiative. It
is popular There is some intellectual but almost no political opposition to its main
features. And it is even exportable .... Yet few people know what the law really
commands, how its doctrines have evolved, or the nature of its ultimate impact upon our
national well-being. Even among the specialized and elite corps of lawyers who operate
the antitrust system there is remarkably little critical understanding of the policy.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrrnuST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 3 (1978).
9. See Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 914 (discussing "core principles of antitrust").
10. The Sherman Act is notoriously lean in content. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
l1. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
12. The new economy encompasses high-technology industries driven by the fluid exchange of
ideas. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
13. George W. Bush endured a bizarre and difficult election odyssey into the White House, losing
the popular vote, but winning the electoral tally by the most minute margin thirty-four days after the
vote. See Bryan Smith, The Wacky. Tacky Race for President; Nation Was Swept Up as Court Fights
Kept Raging, CHI. SUN-TIME.S, Dec. 15,2000, at 8 (providing a colorful narrative of the relevant events);
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center stage, and its relevance and application demand serious review.'"
This article responds to the fundamental issues surrounding antitrust regulation in
the new millennium as punctuated by Microsoft's ongoing enforcement battle. As a
threshold matter, antitrust law may be old, but it is not outdated. Although the
marketplace for competitive frogs has certainly dramatically changed, the need for
competition protection has not. In fact, in important respects, antitrust regulations are
more necessary now than they have ever been in the past, and they will be effective
so long as the regulations are applied efficaciously. After all, as the economy
becomes more dynamic, the competitive framework becomes more fragile and
different market leaders constantly vie for position. Similarly, as business expands
worldwide through merger combinations, antitrust regulation becomes crucial to fair
and effective competition. As they have in the past, antitrust case authority and
economic theories will evolve to accommodate the new economy and fluid market
conditions. The Microsoft scenario only underscores these conclusions. Win or lose,
Microsoft's antitrust dilemma graphically demonstrates the challenges faced by
competitors in a high-tech, dynamic marketplace. Microsoft's "big case" context
catches attention, but in reality does not differ greatly from the struggles endured by
other high-tech business goliaths in earlier times. 5 In the end, the true significance
of the Microsoft antitrust litigation may be its role in awakening a renewed emphasis
on competition regulation, rather than its specific legal holding. With this fresh
awakening, antitrust enforcement in the twenty-first century indeed holds exciting
possibilities.
To evaluate the future of antitrust enforcement, this article begins with an overview
of the law's development and application, including the cyclical nature of and the
economic explanations for antitrust regulation. Part II describes the special challenges
facing antitrust law in today's dynamic marketplace, given the new economy's
features and the competition pressures imposed by mergers and globalization.
Building upon an appreciation of both the historical context and the modem
dilemmas, Part III presents the Microsoft story, which weaves together the relevant
issues underlying antitrust enforcement and highlights the tensions concerning its
future. As a backdrop for the Microsoft experience, the article also provides
summaries of the AT&T and IBM antitrust investigations, which provide startling
similarities under comparable circumstances. Finally, Part IV evaluates the future of
antitrust enforcement, in light of the changing political climate and the rapidly
evolving, high-tech economy. Part IV concludes that frogs will compete very nicely
see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (largely resolving the election outcome).
14. In fact, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner announced in March 2001 that he
was preparing a bill that could lead to the first major revision of American antitrust laws in nearly a
century. The bill would create an antitrust modernization commission to make recommendations about
whether the Sherman Act and Clayton Act should be updated. Sensenbrenner: Antitrust Overhaul Due,
CONGRESS DAILY AM, Mar. 22, 2001, 2001 WL 5046960 (describing Sensenbrenner's proposed
commission, which would examine three areas: intellectual property's role in antitrust law, the global
economy's effect on antitrust enforcement, and the regulatory role of state attorneys general).
15. AT&T and IBM faced remarkably similar antitrust difficulties in their eras. See infra Parts
IV.B.2 & IV.B.3.
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in the new millennium pond under the current regulatory regime, if this regime is
properly applied.
I. Antitrust Enforcement: The Long Roller Coaster Ride
A. Policies and Politics
Although the history of this distinctly American enterprise 6 presents equivocal
foundations, 7 scholars virtually all agree that antitrust's principal purpose is to
preserve and foster competition. 8 Antitrust enforcement embodies a "fundamental
national economic policy,'' 9 and federal interest in enforcement is substantial." By
protecting competition,' this regulation seeks to preserve economic freedom and our
free enterprise system.'
The major interpretive issue is how to construe competition protection, and critical
policy tensions underlie this construction. One primary view is that antitrust
regulation must work hand-in-hand with market forces; in other words, markets
generally work well when left alone, and government regulators should be restrained
16. For helpful historical perspectives on antitrust law, see Robert A. Skitol, The Shifting Sands of
Antitrust Policy: Where It Has Been, Where It Is Now, Where It Will Be in Its Third Century, 9 CORNELL
J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 239 (1999).
17. Construing what has happened so long ago can be a most difficult challenge:
What we all "know" is wrong. We are working from an intellectual base that does not
exist. What is true is that our ideas ore old; they carry whatever credentials time alone
can confer. The years 1890 to 1914 witnessed the origin of every major theory that drives
and directs the evolution of antitrust doctrine to this day. What the court, the Congress,
and the enforcement agencies have wrought since is little more than the working out of
the implications of those early hypotheses. If modem results often appear sensational, that
is less because anything fundamentally new has occurred than because we are diverted by
new vocabulary from seeing continuity in superficial diversity and, more importantly,
because we never really understood the sweeping implications of the old ideas.
BORK, supra note 8, at 15.
18. See Jay Dratier, Jr., Microsoft as an Antitrust Target: IBM in Software?, 25 SW. U. L. REv. 67 1,
682 (1996) (summarizing the entire body of antitrust law in one word: competition). Antitrust regulation
has largely emphasized the possession of monopoly power, which is the ability to "exclude competition."
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). When determining whether
particular conduct unfairly restrains trade, the "true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as ... may suppress or even destroy competition." Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918).
19. Carnation Co. v. Pac. Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966).
20. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 350 (1987) (stating that there is substantial federal
interest in such enforcement).
21. It is important to note that antitrust laws protect the competitive process, not individual
competitors. E.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993)
(noting that federal antitrust laws do not protect one competitor from another's malice); At. Richfield
Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990) (stating that antitrust laws do not shield
competitors from nonpredatory price competition); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962) (stating that antitrust laws protect "competition, not competitors"); Dratler, supra note 18, at 684
(describing this notion and saying that it "lies at the heart of the antitrust dilemma").
22. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (calling the Sherman Act
the "Magna Carta of free enterprise").
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in their efforts.' On the other hand, some contend that the marketplace alone cannot
preserve fair competition if some participants engage in activities that unnaturally
coerce or suppress the consumers' options. Antitrust enforcement involves the
delicate balance of these two competing perspectives.
Since antitrust regulation's inception, federal enforcement has substantially
increased' and has displayed cyclical tendencies. Prior to the end of the twentieth
century, most Sherman Act antitrust regulation occurred during two principal periods:
1890-1914 and 1937-82V6 The explanation for this cyclical behavior is unclear.
Some contend that enforcement activity peaks roughly when public distrust of large
corporate enterprises is greatest.27 Many have attempted to attribute this record to
interest-group politics. This argument has been quite successful in other regulatory
contextsU but less so in the antitrust area because the evidence just does not
23. One commentator described the appropriate relationship between regulators and market forces:
Markets usually work. At least, they usually work better than the institutions of antitrust
in servicing the interests of consumers. When there is good reason to believe that a
market has failed, that antitrust can intervene to improve matters, and that it will do so
more quickly than would the market left alone, then it should intervene, and only to the
extent necessary. What enforcers and judges need, therefore, is a sense of humility.
John E. Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument to Arrogance, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 162 (2000).
24. Antitrust enforcement occurs through various mechanisms, including federal action, state action,
and treble damages suits by private parties.
25. Between 1890 and 1925, for example, the Department of Justice brought an average of only
eight cases each year. From 1926 to 1937. the average rose to about eleven per year, and through 1950,
the annual average rose again to about fifty. MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 104 (4th ed. 1997) (describing nature and scope of federal agencies' antitrust enforcement
efforts). Since 1950, civil enforcement has fluctuated, with its lowest levels occurring during the Reagan
era of the 1980s. Id at 104-05 (citing figures from the Annual Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Annual Reports of the Attorney General). Some complained
that the Reagan enforcement activity pursued only "commercial pygmies," ignoring the major players.
See id. at 105 (noting that Reagan nonmerger enforcement activity shifted heavily to smaller firms).
26. See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the
Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REv. 1105, 1112 (1989) (breaking the three eras
of deconcentration initiatives into the following periods: 1904-20, 1937-56, and 1969-82).
27. The impact of public perceptions on antitrust enforcement and other regulatory activity is
discussed in Louis GALAMBOS, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF BIG BUSINESS IN AMERICA: 1880-1940, at 253-69
(1974), discussing empirical data reflecting shifts in public opinion regarding corporations, and
Hofstadter, supra note 2, at 188-237, describing timing of popular antitrust movement and enforcement
efforts. One way to gauge public attitudes is to consider the timing of antitrust legislation. Antitrust
activism also appears to coincide with congressional activity in the area. See Kovacic, supra note 26,
at 1124 (discussing the significance of congressional activity as a gauge of public perceptions).
28. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 942 (2001) (noting
that "interest-group politics" is "an approach that has worked for a number of govemment agencies and
programs").
29. See, e.g., Malcolm B. Coate et al., Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, in THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 213 (Fred S. McChesney
& William F. Shughart II eds., 1995) (same); Posner, supra note 28, at 942 (noting that efforts to explain
antitrust enforcement in terms of politics have not been successful); George J. Stigler, The Origin of the
Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1985) (concluding that antitrust enforcement is generally not
politically motivated). But see Roger L. Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J.L. & ECON. 329 (1982)
(concluding that the FTC was unduly influenced in the 1960s by the parochial interests of Congress
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support the conclusion that government collusion or incompetence has affected
regulatory cycles" Federal judges are arguably protected from political pressures
by their secure tenure,3' and agencies are subject to potentially greater controls and
restrictions than the courts. 2 Certainly, economics have a direct impact on cyclical
antitrust enforcement
3
B. Cycles of Antitrust Enforcement
1. In the Beginning
In 1890 President Benjamin Harrison signed Bill S.I., which later became known
as the Sherman Act,' and federal antitrust regulation began. The Act contains two
simple prohibitions: section I declares that all agreements, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of trade are unlawful; section 2 makes unlawful the
monopolization or attempted monopolization of trade or commerce. The Act left
courts to further define these broad and general restrictions. In short order, the courts
concluded that only unreasonable trade restraints were illegal,35 although the
demarcation line between reasonable and unreasonable restraints remains a hotly
contested issue today.'
members overseeing the Commission).
30. See, e.g., ALAN STONE, WRONG NUMBER: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 10-13 (1989) (discussing
the view that, despite instances of capture, corruption, and incompetence in regulatory agencies,
"theoretical and practical considerations militate against generalizing this view"). In fact, the lawyers
populating the antitrust agencies ultimately want private-sector jobs, and that desire motivates a high
level of professionalism. See Posner, supra note 28, at 942 (describing how government lawyers seek
to "land good berths in the private practice of law" and must accordingly "demonstrate their profes-
sionalism").
31. See Posner, supra note 28, at 942 (stating that federal judges "are largely insulated from the
interest-group pressures that play on the other branches of government").
32. See STONE, supra note 30, at 11-12 (describing rigid constraints imposed on regulatory
agencies).
33. In fact, Richard Posner has advanced the explanation that antitrust doctrine has fluctuated in
tandem with changes in economic theory. Posner, supra note 28, at 942 ("Looking over the entire history
of U.S. antitrust law, I conclude that the most powerful explanatory variable is simply the state of
economic opinion.").
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000). The Sherman Act has been called the "comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade." N. Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see also United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972) (stating that the Sherman Act is "as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our
free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms").
35. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 60 (1911) (adopting the reasonableness
standard in antitrust enforcement and stating that the Sherman Act inevitably calls for the exercise of
judgment).
36. How and where to draw the "reasonableness" line has been a controversial topic since the
beginning:
The courts quickly determined that [section 1] did not really make illegal all concerted
action in restraint of trade but only concerted action in "unreasonable" restraint of trade.
How and where to draw the line between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade
was hotly debated at the turn of the nineteenth century and remains so as we now begin
the twenty-first century. Teddy Roosevelt popularized the notion that the second
2001]
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After populist sentiment put Woodrow Wilson in the White House, Congress
enacted two new statutes in 19143 The Federal Trade Commission Act created the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an independent administrative agency with the
purpose of preventing all unfair methods of competition.3' The Clayton Act rendered
unlawful all corporate mergers and stock acquisitions that "may" have the effect of
substantially "lessen[ing] competition or tend[ing] to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce." '39
In the very early years of antitrust enforcement, regulators were largely concerned
with the dangers associated with industrial giants.m ' By 1912, Woodrow Wilson and
Louis Brandeis captured public sentiment with their attacks on "the curse of
bigness."4 ' Within two years, Congress had enacted the Federal Trade Commission
Act' and the Clayton Act43 as additional tools for protecting local entrepreneurs
from the tyranny and predations of massive national rivals.
Although regulation was extremely prolific during this early era," World War I
reduced the country's enthusiasm for antitrust enforcement." A decade of "big-
business-boostering Republican rule!" followed in the 1920s. After the stock market
crash of 1929, the country slipped into the Great Depression, a time of devastating
economic misery that undercut the population's faith in the free-enterprise system 7
and resulted in a quiet period for antitrust enforcement.
prohibition did not make illegal all monopolies but only "bad" ones. Again, how to
distinguish between good and bad monopolies remains a lively debate spanning the turn
of two centuries.
Skitol, supra note 16, at 241.
37. Id. (describing antitrust attitudes in Wilson's era).
38. The Federal Trade Commission Act is now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-57 (2000).
39. The Clayton Act is now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-26 (2000).
40. The prevailing national mood was a suspicion of big business. See generally RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITCAL TRADrnON 327-36 (1948); THOMAS K. McCRAw, PROPHETS
OF REGULATION 94-114 (1984).
41. See Skitol, supra note 16, at 241 (discussing Wilson and Brandeis at a time when "[t]he fault
lines were clear").
42. 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45).
43. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
44. See Hofstadter, supra note 2, at 193 (describing the 1890-1914 period as the "Progressive era"
when the antitrust movement was in "high gear"); Kovacic, supra note 26, at 1112 (stating that "[t]he
earliest period of Sherman Act deconcentration activity was also the most prolific").
45. See Hofstadter, supra note 2, at 193 (calling this period the "era of neglect").
46. See Skitol, supra note 16, at 242 (describing the antitrust enforcement attitudes during the 1920s
and 1930s); see also Robert S. Marx, New Interpretations of the Anti-trust Law as Applied to Business,
Trade, Farm and Labor Associations, 2 U. CIN. L REv. 211, 222-23 (1928) (proclaiming that "[t]his is
the day of big business .... The day of the blatant trust-buster is definitely over.").
47. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 1919-1933, at 155-203 (1957)
(discussing how the 1929 crash eliminated the respect American business institutions enjoyed in the
1920s).
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2. FDR Reinvigorates Competition Regulation
During the 1930s, mass merchandising began to emerge, and the discounted prices
resulting from this mass merchandising threatened mom-and-pop operations across
the country.3 To protect small businesses from the large chain stores, Congress
enacted the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936' and the Miller-Tydings Act in 1937.'
By the decade's end, President Roosevelt declared war on cartels and monopolies
across the economy, focusing on "naked" trade restraints.' At the same time, the
Supreme Court strengthened and extended prior holdings that such agreements were
illegal per se.' As the country mobilized for World War I, merger activity sparked
an alarming rise in industrial concentration. Congress responded by enacting the
Celler-Kefauver Ace in 1950, closing major loopholes in the 1914 Clayton Act's
coverage of mergers. This inaugurated a period of aggressive merger regulation over
the next two decades'
During the Eisenhower years, the Justice Department initiated a series of
spectacular criminal price-fixing conspiracy cases against General Electric Company,
Westinghouse Corporation, and several smaller electrical equipment manufacturers,;"
This sent the message that antitrust compliance was critically important. Corporations
began doing "business with one eye constantly cast over their shoulders at the
Antitrust Division."5'
48. Chain stores created new competitive pressures for small businesses:
One new form of competition that emerged in those Depression years was discounting
through newly-emerging giant mass merchandisers. These vast chains leaned on
manufacturers for far better prices than mom-and-pop stores paid for their goods, and the
chains passed the benefit onto their customers. While their lower prices were a boon to
consumers, they were a threat to the survival of mom-and-pops. Huey Long sought to
champion the cause of morn-and-pops everywhere with his declaration that he "would
rather have thieves and gangsters than chain stores in Louisiana."
Skitol, supra note 16, at 232 (quoting THEODORE N. BECKMAN & HERMAN C. NOLAN, THE CHAIN
STORE PROBLEM 336-37 (1938) (quoting Huey Long)).
49. The 1936 Robinson-Patman Act broadened prohibitions on price discrimination, actually
encouraging cartel pricing in many industries.
50. The Miller-Tydings Act authorized states to enact Fair Trade Laws allowing manufacturers to
enforce price-maintenance agreements on resellers. See generally Skitol, supra note 16, at 242-43
(discussing how these acts assisted mom-and-pop businesses).
51. FDR appointed Thurman Arnold as Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.
Arnold's staff and budget tripled in his first three years in office. See Skitol, supra note 16, at 243
(describing the "renewed commitment" to antitrust enforcement during this period).
52. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,813 (1946); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
53. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)).
54. See Skitol, supra note 16, at 243-44 (discussing merger activity and the enactment of the Celler-
Kefauver Act).
55. Several high-level executives went to prison as a result, and the plaintiffs' antitrust bar followed
up with a burst of treble damages actions on behalf of electric utilities and other equipment buyers. See
id. at 244.
56. Hofstadter, supra note 2, at 192-93 (describing how antitrust enforcement was affecting the
business community).
20011
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
The 1960s represented a high water mark in antitrust enforcement; the government
"challenged everything."" Ironically, this extremely active era occurred even as
public mistrust of "big business" diminished."' The Warren Supreme Court
condemned numerous mergers and joint ventures," and dissenting Justice Potter
Stewart complained that the only consistency in these merger cases was that "the
Government always wins."' On the final day of President Johnson's administration,
the government initiated its suit against IBM. 6 During this period, the Court also
expansively construed section 2 of the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act
to impose liability under relatively vague notions of exclusionary conduct and
predatory pricing. The 1970s reflected a continued period of aggressive enfor-
cemente and a new spurt of antitrust legislation. Congress strengthened the
government's antimerger enforcement methods, and congressional oversight
committees pressed for more government suits.'
3. Into the 1980s: Antitrust Goes Dormant
Beginning in 1977, the Court cut back on the proliferation of private antitrust
litigation. First, the Court held that certain restraints were no longer illegal per se -
that certain arrangements could actually be efficient and procompetitive.' The Court
also established new criteria for antitrust standing and barred indirect purchasers from
antitrust relief.'
Thus, although the government's antitrust regulation remained vigorous through the
1970s, the Supreme Court took a much more cautious stance. Scholars generally
attribute this judicial change to the enhanced popularity of the Chicago School's
antitrust analysis a scholarly movement centered at the University of Chicago and
joined by antitrust critics at law schools and economics departments of universities
57. See Skitol, supra note 16, at 264 (quoting Antitrust Division Chief Joel Klein).
58. See Hofstadter, supra note 2, at 194 (describing this revival period as ironic, given that public
respect for large corporations had increased).
59. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v.
Penn-Olin Chem. Co.. 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
60. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. at 301.
61. See infra Part IV.B.3.
62. Some prominent scholars opposed this expansion. One vocal critic was Alan Greenspan, who
later came to lead the Federal Reserve. See Skitol, supra note 16, at 245 n.24 (discussing Greenspan's
views).
63. See Kovacic, supra note 26, at 1106-09 (detailing aggressive activities through the mid-1970s).
64. See id. at 1126 (stating that the 1970s "marked another period of legislative activism").
65. See id. (discussing congressional antitrust-related activities during the 1970s).
66. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (form of horizontal
price fixing was a necessary part of collaboration with significant efficiency-enhancing potential); Cont'l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) (enhancement of interbrand competition
outweighed elimination of intrabrand competition).
67. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1977) (limits on
standing); I1l. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746-47 (1977) (indirect purchasers).
68. See Skitol, supra note 16. at 248 (describing the Chicago School's impact on the Supreme
Court).
[Vol. 54:285
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss2/3
MICROSOFT, MERGERS, AND MORE
across the country. The philosophy presented consumer welfare as antitrust law's
sole legitimate objective. Under the Chicago School's approach, consumer welfare
meant an economy-wide allocative efficiency without regard for populist concerns,
including political, social, or wealth-redistribution matters." Although this growing
economic philosophy had its critics,7' the national consciousness was more attuned
to economic efficiency than to alternative enforcement rationales.'
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration wholly endorsed the Chicago School's
approach."3 President Reagan appointed William Baxter as his first Chief of the
Antitrust Division. Baxter settled the AT&T case and abandoned the IBM
prosecution on the same day in 1982.:' Federal enforcement during this period
tended to focus on small-scale targets, 5 and the overall activity levels even fell
below those of the 1930s, when the Sherman Act's future seemed in doubt. 6 During
the 1980s, the Supreme Court handed down antitrust cases with differing results,
tightening antitrust standards in some respects but loosening them in others.'
69. In the mid-1970s, Robert Bork became the Chicago School's most prominent spokesman. He
captured the essence of this movement's philosophy in his seminal book entitled The Antitrust Paradox:
A Policy at War with Itself. See BORK, supra note 8. Richard A. Posner and Frank Easterbrook also
shaped the Chicago School of antitrust economics. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTrrRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); RICHARD POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES,
ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS (2d ed. 1981).
70. See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoff, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18 (1968) (presenting the Chicago School's position).
71. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979)
(arguing that political values are essential to antitrust analysis).
72. After all, at the end of the 1970s, inflation and unemployment were at record highs, and Ronald
Reagan called to "get the government off the backs of business." Skitol, supra note 16, at 249
(describing the economic climate in the late 1970s).
73. President Reagan placed Chicago School scholars in the courts and in enforcement agencies.
See id. at 250 (stating that Reagan installed "true believers").
74. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
75. The Antitrust Division prosecuted conspiracies among local cement producers, milk distributors,
and wholesale bakeries, while the FTC concentrated upon codes of conduct within small business and
professional associations. See Skitol, supra note 16, at 252 (discussing federal enforcement during the
1980s).
76. See Minda, supra note 2, at 1755 (describing nonenforcement during the 1980s); Kovacic, supra
note 26, at 1148-49 (discussing low levels of enforcement during the 1980s, but predicting the Sherman
Act's return); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. Rev. 817, 821 (1987) (noting
the movement toward a "minimalist" policy of nonenforcement during the 1980s).
77. For example, the Court toughened evidentiary requirements for inferring concerted action in
section 1 cases. See, e.g., Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1986). During the same period, the Court
reaffirmed the per se rule in certain contexts. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servs. Corp., 465
U.S. 752, 760 (1984).
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4. Antitrust Enforcement on the Move Again
By 1988, current events had convinced most people that the country needed more
serious antitrust enforcement.' President George Bush came into office appointing
antitrust enforcers who reflected mainstream antitrust policy." The subsequent
revival of federal antitrust enforcement won broad bipartisan support'
The 1990s brought a "new federalism" of cooperative activity between federal and
state antitrust enforcers." Another trend was the internationalization of antitrust
enforcement.' During this period, the Chicago School's economic approach began
to lose its luster; the post-Chicago School crowd discarded allocative efficiency in
favor of competition protection to the extent such protection unambiguously
benefitted consumers. 3 President Clinton's presidential terms involved numerous
important antitrust issues, including the following: the Microsoft case; enhanced
78. Thoughtfil commentators believed a change in enforcement policy was necessary for many
reasons:
[A]ntitrust permissiveness and indeed the more general "deregulation" of big business had
gone too far. The nation suffered through a stock market crash, the S&L debacle and
other disasters with their roots in anything-goes cowboy capitalism. By the time of
George Bush's inauguration, there was a consensus even among most segments of the
Republican Party that the country again needed serious antitrust cops on the beat.
Skitol, supra note 16, at 253.
79. President Bush appointed James Rill to be the new Antitrust Division Chief and Janet Steiger
as the new Chair of the FTC. See id.
80. See id. (describing this revival of federal antitrust enforcement policy).
81. See it (describing the common ground enjoyed by federal enforcers and state attorneys general).
Merger regulation was a major focus of this cooperation. See id.
82. This internationalization initiative had several dimensions. Under the Bush Administration,
antitrust enforcement policy targeted European and Asian firms, pushing the frontiers of U.S. laws'
extraterritorial reach. See id. at 254-55 (describing the globalization initiative). International antitrust
enforcement also became increasingly cooperative, especially as antitrust policy became a significant
feature of the European Economic Community. See id.
83. See generally Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics: Economist, Lawyers, Judges
and Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical World, 63 ANTITRUsT L.J. 669, 677, 681
(1995) (describing post-Chicago School economics as a more complex analysis than the Chicago School's
deductive theoretical approach). This post-Chicago approach used a "consumer welfare" standard, but
defined it to mean
preservation of competition for the unambiguous benefit of consumers rather than
unfettered freedom of producers to undertake whatever might be rationalized in the name
of maximizing allocative efficiency. They brought insights from business management and
"game theory" scholars about certain kinds of "strategic" conduct that could enable
dominant firms in concentrated industries to raise entry barriers and raise rivals' costs in
ways that this school considered appropriate targets of antitrust enforcement.
Skitol, supra note 16, at 255; see also Michael S. Jacobs, The New SophLtication in Antitrust, 79 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 53 (1994) (stating that the post-Chicago School's "atheoretical complexity" will pose serious
practical problems); Minda, supra note 2, at 1753 n.19 (describing the "post-Chicago" School as offering
"new theories of market behavior and strategic decision making developed from particularized studies
of real markets to challenge the ideological orientation of the Chicago School"); Symposium on Post-
Chicago Economics, 63 ANITRUST LJ. 445 (1995).
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merger enforcement activity;" FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky's broad-ranging
reassessment of antitrust policy;5 stepped-up international regulation; the ack-
nowledgement of innovation competition (as opposed to price competition) as the
main focus of antitrust attention;-, and the growing competition concerns flowing
from the rapidly changing health-care sectorY"
During this same period, the Supreme Court took an eclectic path, marching "to
its own unique drummer in its evolution of antitrust jurisprudence."" In some ways,
the Court construed antitrust laws generously and caused the laws to reach new
heights;" in other respects, the Court imposed important limits on specific types of
enforcement actions. 0
111. Antitrust Law in 2001
A. New Politics, New Policies?
Many of these same antitrust issues remain on current President George W. Bush's
plate. Bush campaigned on a "compassionate conservative" platform, but the
candidate did not say much about his competition philosophy.' In general, President
Bush indicates a preference for deregulation, but does support government
intervention to break up monopolies.'
With respect to the changing political scene, some suggest that we have achieved
an "antitrust mainstream" with broad bipartisan support, making the President's
politics superfluous 3 If President Bush makes changes in antitrust enforcement,
84. See infra Part III.B.
85. For this reassessment. Pitofsky conducted three months of public bearings to obtain input from
all quarters of the antitrust community. Ultimately, the FTC published a report entitled "Anticipating the
21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace." See Skitol, supra note
16, at 256-57 (describing the report).
86. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
87. See Skitol, supra note 16, at 257-58 (describing antitrust challenges under the Clinton
administration); see also Janet L. McDavid & Robert F. Leibenluft, What Impact Will Bush Have?, NAr'L.
LJ., Feb. 5, 2001, at B8 (stating that Clinton's high-profile initiatives made antitrust law front-page
news).
88. Skitol, supra note 16, at 258.
89. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (endorsing expansive
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign antitrust conduct); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (permitting antitrust claims against high-technology equipment
manufacturers who attempted to suppress competition for after-sale service by independent service
providers); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (narrowing the antitrust exemption for
government-approved anticompetitive conduct).
90. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (applying apermissive rule of reason analysis
to resale price maintenance); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993) (limiting circumstances for predatory pricing liability); Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S.
447 (1993) (tightening requirements for attempted monopolization liability).
91. See Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Bush Administration: Passionate Conservative Antitrust?,
N.Y. LJ., Feb. 20, 2001, at 7 (concluding that, for the short term, antitrust enforcement is likely to be
"business as usual").
92. See Brody Mullins & Neil Munro, Clues to Bush's High Tech Plans, NAT'L J., Jan. 20, 2001,
at 192 (describing Bush's general stance).
93. This "antitrust mainstream" is premised upon the following principles:
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such changes will likely be marginal, giving a slight nod to self-correcting markets
based on a reluctance to overregulate." In February 2001, Bush nominated Charles
A. James, a moderate-to-conservative practitioner who is well known among the
national antitrust bar, to run the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department!5 The
following month, President Bush named conservative Timothy J. Muris to become
the next FTC chairman." Both appointees will likely follow a centrist path in
antitrust enforcement.
President Bush will face at least two unusual developments when applying antitrust
law in the twenty-first century. First, through the 1990s, United States business
activity exploded abroad while mergers occurred at a record-breaking pace
domestically and internationally. Second, high-technology companies have begun
participating in uniquely innovative markets that arguably transform the very nature
of competition.
B. Merger Mania
Through the century's end, an unprecedented merger explosion" embraced the
The goal of antitrust enforcement is to enhance consumer welfare and to allow consumers
the widest choice of the best products at the lowest prices. Naked price fixing
conspiracies merit tough criminal prosecution. Economic analysis must play a critical role
in antitrust enforcement. Antitrust enforcement is particularly important for industries that
have not historically relied on competitive forces, largely as a result of regulation, such
as utilities, transportation, telecommunications and health care. Many recent mergers have
been strategic transactions involving direct competitors, firms that have vertical
relationships or firms seeking access to new technologies, markets or skills. These
transactions have a greater potential for anticompetitive effects than many mergers in
previous years, and they must be reviewed carefully. Nonetheless, mergers are generally
either efficient or competitively neutral, merger analysis must take efficiencies into
account, and big is not necessarily bad. Anticompetitive effects are often hard to predict,
and misguided enforcement can deter innovation or prevent efficiencies. The likely
alternative to antitrust enforcement is regulation, There is a need for continued or even
enhanced coordination with foreign antitrust authorities. Through close working relation-
ships, the FTC and DOJ and their foreign counterparts have achieved some convergence
on many issues.
McDavid & Leibenluft, supra note 87, at B8 (noting that this "antitrust mainstream" will likely endure
in the new Bush administration).
94. See generally id. (setting forth potential policy changes under a Bush team).
95. See James V. Grimaldi, Skilled in the Ways of Antitrust: Nominee Charles James to Face Key
Cases, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2001, at El (describing the nominee's background and credentials).
96. Muris worked as a low-level FTC staffer in the mid-1970s, then returned as a senior staff
appointee under the Reagan Administration. If confirmed, some believe Muris will follow a centrist
course on competition regulation. See Caroline E. Mayer & James V. Grimaldi, Bush Pick for FTC Was
on '80s Staff, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2001, at E0 (stating that both critics and supporters call Muris
"very very bright," a "policy wonk," "approachable," and "dazzlingly conservative"). Others predict major
policy changes when the FTC changes hands. See John R. Wilke, Muris to Usher in FTC Changes on
Antitrust, Web-Privacy Policy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2001, at A4 (describing the "sweeping changes"
expected in federal antitrust enforcement under the Bush administration).
97. See generally supra note 93.
98. This wave is unprecedented both in terms of numbers and dollar values. See Parker & Balto,
supra note 6, at 351 (stating that the United States "is in the midst of an unprecedented merger wave"
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country and reshaped the face of corporate America.' Merger waves are certainly
not a new phenomenon. In the modem era, merger activity has surged in the 1960s,
the 1980s, and from 1993 to the present." Although strong merger activity is not
itself unique, the current merger wave's impact on antitrust enforcement and policy
has been significant. The same factors' driving today's heightened merger levels
will also affect antitrust law's direction in the new millennium.
The first factor pushing mergers forward is deregulation, which had some effect
in the 1980s,' but which has played a more prominent role in recent times.
Deregulatory changes have subsequently occurred in many more industries, 3
permitting firms to acquire either new economies of scale or broader economies of
scope. Although deregulation successfully freed industries to combine with less
restraint, deregulation also created transition problems because formerly heavily
regulated businesses suddenly exploded into the free market."
The current merger wave is international in nature; " in fact, international merger
activity is one of globalization's most visible and significant results." American
and providing 1998 statistics). In 1991, enforcement agencies reviewed 1529 mergers; by 1998, that
figure rose to 4728. The dollar value of U.S. mergers consummated in 1998 exceeded $1.2 trillion,
nearly one-seventh of our gross domestic economy. See Skitol, supra note 16, at 264 n.74. One year
later, U.S. mergers totaled a record $1.8 trillion. See Bernard S. Black, The First International Merger
Wave (and the Fifth and Last U.S. Wave), 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 799,799 (2000) (citing 1999 statistics).
In 2000, mergers achieved a value of $1.75 trillion. See McDavid & Leibenluft, supra note 87, at B8
(noting the unprecedented merger wave and the activity in 2000). See generally Joseph H. Flom, Mergers
& Acquisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 753 (2000) (briefly reviewing merger
activity through the 1990s).
99. See Leslie Wayne, Wave of Mergers Is Recasting Pace of Business in U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
19, 1998, at AI (stating that today's merger wave is reshaping corporate America).
100. For an overview of takeover waves since 1960, see Carol B. Swanson, The Turn in Takeovers:
A Study in Public Appeasement and Unstoppable Capitalism, 30 GA. L. REv. 943, 958-81 (1996); see
also Black, supra note 98, at 800 (describing five merger waves since the Sherman Act was enacted in
1890).
101. See generally Black, supra note 98, at 807-11 (detailing fourteen factors supporting the most
recent surge in mergers); Flom, supra note 98, at 774-75 (setting forth twenty-one factors favoring
merger growth); Swanson, supra note 100, at 989 (discussing the factors propelling the surge of
takeovers in the 1990s); Bloomberg Business News, At Record Pace, Firms Say, 7 Do" to Corporate
Marriages, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Sept. 30, 1995, at DI (describing important factors affecting the
merger pace).
102. In the 1980s, the FTC reviewed a substantial number of mergers in the deregulated natural gas
and airlines industries. See Parker & Balto, supra note 6, at 354.
103. These industries include telecommunications, electricity, interstate banking, and railroads. See
id. at 354 (describing deregulatory changes); Swanson, supra note 100, at 990 n.198 (discussing the new
rules eliminating merger barriers in various industries).
104. See Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 913 (citing the telecommunications industry and utilities as
"leading examples" of transitional problems).
105. See Black, supra note 98, at 799 (calling current merger activity the "fifth U.S. merger wave"
and the "first-ever international merger wave"). The 1990s witnessed the continued liberalization of
government restrictions, the easing of cross-border cash access, and technological advances, all
facilitating substantial growth in international transactions, which rose from $61.1 billion in deals in 1991
to $814.3 billion in 1999. See Flom, supra note 98, at 763 (describing cross-border activity).
106. See Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, A By-Product of the Globalization Process: The
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consumers' product markets are more global in scope, causing mergers and takeovers
to increasingly cut across national boundaries. Mergers involving only U.S.
companies comprise a shrinking percentage of the worldwide totals."0 7 Ap-
proximately half of the FTC's full merger investigations involve a foreign party, or
assets or information located abroad."s From a policy perspective, this inter-
nationalization through business mergers benefits the consumer because it creates
procompetitive results."° Market globalization also imposes competitive pressures
on domestic businesses to become bigger, better, and more efficient through
mergers."
0
Technological changes also drive mergers. In this technological era, businesses
combine in order to facilitate the acquisition of new technology to create greater
research capabilities"' or simply to enhance competitiveness in a fast-moving
market.
Finally, the economy significantly affects merger activity. Low interest rates create
a favorable commercial climate for investing in corporate marriages."' In addition,
the robust stock market over the past decade has made stock exchange transactions
a popular means for business combinations."' More recently, however, the stock
market has been in retreat, and the frenzied merger activity has cooled." 4
Rise of Cross-Border Bank Mergers and Acquisitions - The U.S. Regulatory Framework, 56 Bus. LAW.
591, 591-92 (2001) (declaring that bank mergers with substantial international implications provide
"visible and significant dimensions of the ongoing 'globalization'") (footnote omitted).
107. In 1999, for example, U.S.-only takeovers constituted only about 40% of the worldwide total
measured in dollars and only 30% in terms of number of transactions. See Black, supra note 98, at 799
(providing 1999 statistics).
108. In addition, approximately 25% of all mergers reported to the federal government involve
parties from different countries. See Parker & Balto, supra note 6, at 354 (citing statistics regarding
merger globalization).
109. Id. ("Many mergers directly associated with the globalization phenomenon are procompetitive.
A merger may enhance a firm's ability to compete in foreign markets by providing rapid access to an
established distribution system, knowledge of local markets, economies of scale, and complementary
products.").
110. Because of these competitive pressures, companies engage in downsizing and consolidation to
become more efficient. See generally id. at 355 (discussing downsizing and consolidation as prominent
forces driving mergers); Steve Lipin, Merger Wave Gathers Force as Strategies Demand Buying or Being
Bought, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1997, at Al (stating that businesses are increasingly concerned about
being number one or two in their markets).
111. See David A. Balto & James Mongoven, Antitrust Enforcement in Pharmaceutical Industry
Mergers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 255 (1999) (describing merger impact on research development
capabilities).
112. See Parker & Balto, supra note 6, at 356 (stating that "low interest rates and low inflation have
produced a favorable climate for investment").
113. See generally id. (noting the impact of a "booming stock market" on the merger climate).
114. In fact, in February 2001, only 162 mergers and acquisitions totaling $4.8 billion were
announced, making it the slowest month for deals since May 1997. See Amazon Shares Fall; No Wal-
Mart Deal, USA TODAY, Mar. 7. 2001 (citing Thomson Financial Securities Data); see aLro Stephen
Gandel, Economic Chill, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Mar. 19, 2001, at I (stating that the "weak stock market
has long cooled such investment banking businesses as equity underwriting and mergers-and-acquisitions
advisory work); Randall Smith, Deals & Deal Makers: Morgan Stanley, Lehman, Bear Stearns Saw Net
Income Slump in First Quarter, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2001, at C18 (noting significant decrease in
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Government merger enforcement is also at record-high levels," ' although the
reasons for this heightened activity are unclear."' Some suggest that the increased
regulation results from two trends: the increasingly strategic nature of today's
mergers"7 and the enforcement agencies' greater unwillingness to settle."' In
some respects, the merger movement has been engaged in an intricate ballet with
antitrust enforcement through the modern era."9 There is some sense that, at least
with respect to this country's earlier industrial history, tougher antitrust regulation
cycled after periods of permissiveness or indifference.'"
C. Interpreting Competition in the Modem Marketplace
1. Software, Not Smokestacks
Just as business combinations and enforcement activity have moved cyclically over
time, the look of competition itself has also been transformed. Because antitrust law
revolves around competition,'2' the central question becomes how to measure
competitive impact in a dramatically changing "new economy.'"" Many regard
announced merger volumes). But see Diminished Risk of Penalty Brightening the M&A Climate, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 12, 2001, 2001 WL 3910083 (stating that "some look at what the bear market has done
to bank stocks as clearing the way for acquisition-minded banks to start shopping again); Flom, supra
note 98, at 774 (urging an outlook of even stronger merger growth in the near future).
115. Merger Wave Spurs a New Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1992 (Magazine), at 38 (discussing
merger litigation trends). Despite this increase in enforcement, FTC and Antitrust Division staffing has
remained essentially unchanged. Parker & Balto, supra note 6. at 352 (presenting enforcement statistics
and noting "virtually constant" staffing levels).
116. As two commentators recently observed:
Why is there an increasing level of litigation? Have the enforcement agencies raised
the standards? Are they reinterpreting the law or pushing the envelope in an effort to
develop new law? Although the number and size of litigated cases have changed, there
is no dramatic change in the law or enforcement policy. The agencies continue to enforce
the law as written and as interpreted by the courts. Almost unique in federal law
enforcement, the antitrust agencies set out in the Merger Guidelines their detailed mode
of analysis. There are no preconceptions of how any particular market operates. Rather,
with each new case, the staff of the agencies must roll up their sleeves and search for the
facts that will guide their understanding of the market.
Parker & Balto, supra note 6, at 357.
117. In contrast to the hostile takeovers of the 1980s, business combinations in the 1990s were more
likely to be cooperative affairs involving strategic, rather than financial, bidders. See generally Swanson,
supra note 100, at 990, 994 (describing the difference between financial and strategic bidders).
118. This unwillingness arguably results from the recognition that a settlement that does not
effectively restore competition is simply not worth adopting. See Parker & Balto, supra note 6, at 358
(discussing how the government has reached the conclusion that settlements provide inadequate relief).
119. See Kovacic, supra note 26, at 1112 (arguing that the pattern regulation tends to follow is "a
wave of consolidation by acquisition and merger").
120. This tendency is much less clear during the modem eras of mergers, beginning in the 1960s,
when heavy merger activity coincided with aggressive antitrust enforcement. See id. at 1120-22
(describing this cyclical tendency and noting that the "most recent deconcentration era is explained less
easily as a reaction to lax antitrust policy").
121. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
122. Richard Posner describes the modem context as a "new economy" encompassing three distinct
industries: "the manufacture of computer software; the Interet-based businesses (Internet access
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consumer welfare as the all-important measure. The Chicago School evaluates
consumer welfare in terms of allocative and productive efficiency," while others
prefer the perspective of individual customers or other competitors.' Regardless
of one's chosen definition of consumer welfare, antitrust enforcement either becomes
superfluous or must be substantially altered if competition no longer operates as
traditionally expected, that is, if market dominance no longer has an adverse effect
on the consumer. "
Without question, the face of competition today dramatically differs from
commerce a hundred years ago." At the turn of the nineteenth century, horse-
drawn plows and belching smokestacks characterized the American economy.' 7 .
Capital was inextricably tied to superstructures made of concrete and steel; the bigger
the factories, the better." In addition, the competitive arenas were much more local
and finite in nature. Because markets did not extensively overlap, competing firms
could not move fluidly among geographic areas. 2' In sum, when antitrust law came
into being, commercial production involved the creation of "real stuff' made from
"real stuff' at a "real cost," and the law of diminishing returns logically limited output."
providers, Internet service providers, Internet content providers), such as AOL and Amazon; and the
communications services and equipment designed to support the first two markets." Posner, supra note
28, at 925.
123. The consumer-welfare approach suggests the primary goals of wealth maximization and
efficient production. Michael P. Kenny & William H. Jordan, United States v. Microsoft: Into the
Antitrust Regulatory Vacuum Missteps the Department of Justice, 47 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1364-65 (1998)
(discussing the consumer-welfare goal as supported by Robert Bork and Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp); see also, e.g., BORK, supra note 8, at 405 (stating that the "only goal that should guide
interpretation of the antitrust laws is the welfare of consumers" and that "the single most important factor
contributing to that welfare" is productive efficiency). See generally supra notes 69-73 and accom-
panying text.
124. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
125. Traditionally, it has been assumed that market dominance adversely affects competition by
artificially raising prices, restricting output, or both.
126. See generally RICHARD B. McKENZIE, TRUST ON TRIAL: How THE MIcRosoFT CASE Is
REFRAMING T E RULEs OF CoMPErMoN 2-8 (2000) (describing the fundamental differences in a section
entitled "From Smokestacks to Microchips").
127. The plows represented the shrinking agricultural sector, and the smokestacks stood for the
expanding industrial market. See id. at 2-3 (describing the "advanced economies" of the U.S. during that
era).
128. See id. at 3 (describing the "real capital" in this earlier era).
129. One commentator described this phenomenon in the following way:
Competition was restricted by many mundane factors, not the least of which was the cost
of firms changing their product mixes and shifting their locations. Geography may have
been the more pressing restriction on production, given the expense of transporting
products by road, rail, and ship. For much of the first half of the twentieth century,
business gurus could smartly repeat what was widely believed to be the three most
important factors in doing business - "Location, location, location" - implying that
physical position in markets was crucial to earning above-competitive rates of return.
Id.
130. "The creation of real stuff' refers to the process of manufacturing palpable necessities, such
as making clothing from fabric and housing from wood and brick. See id. (describing "real stuff" in the
earlier era).
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Commerce today stands in stark contrast to the plows-and-smokestacks era. The
market has changed in terms of what is produced, how it is produced, and where it
is sold. Production time has often collapsed into weeks or months, rather than years.
Services have displaced products to a surprising degree, and value now correlates to
service, rather than cost of materials. In a real sense, goods have lost relevance, 3'
and many firms' principal sources of capital are now brainpower and information.
Due to the highly mobile nature of these types of capital, well-established economic
norms may no longer remain true in this new environment.
2. Analyzing Dynamic Competition
Commentators generally agree that the current commercial markets are more
mobile, fluid, and amorphous than commercial markets of the past. These qualities
arguably render markets more responsive and more able to correct problems
associated with coercive competitive power.' In fact, some suggest that the
modern marketplace is so dynamic that monopoly power can only be ephemeral,'
and competition accordingly no longer needs protection. This approach assumes basic
structural differences in today's market economy, and assumes that because of those
changes, commercial forces alone can more effectively address entrenched market
power than can the government's behemoth regulatory structure.'" If true, the
transactional costs associated with antitrust enforcement would make the modem
regulatory system appear inherently outdated.
Economists utilize two different models to describe market structure and perfor-
mance in this new economy: network competition and innovation-based com-
petition.3 ' The network-externality or "network-effect" model teaches that a
131. Business management guru Tom Peters made this point by noting at one of his seminars,
"Welcome to a world where... 'If you can touch it, it's not real.'" Id. at 5.
132. See id, at 7 (raising the question of whether enhanced market fluidity should render antitrust
enforcement more cautious).
133. See Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 915-16 (presenting "durability of market power" as one
explanation).
134. The logical corollary would be that government bureaucrats are, by comparison, more prone
to mistakes that would easily outlive the impact of changing market forces on competition. See Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1. 15 (1984) (stating that the "economic system
corrects monopoly more readily" than mistaken judicial opinions); Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 915 (noting
the argument that market forces act more efficiently than bureaucratic regulation).
135. Innovation-based competition is sometimes called "Schumpeterian Rivalry" after noted
economist Joseph Schumpeter. He coined the phrase "creative destruction" to describe the pursuit of
market power as a creative and dynamic force that constantly destroys and revolutionizes the old
economic structure. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (1942)
(describing the "creative destruction" concept). See generally Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4, at 5-15
(article section discussing "Schumpeterian Rivalry"). Although Schumpeter's doctrine originated more
than half a century ago, scholars still embrace it today as a meaningful framework within which to
discuss competition in computer software markets. See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in
Schumpeterian Industries, 90 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROc. 192, 193 (May 2000) (stating that the
Schumpeterian approach measures fragility in the software industry); Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4,
at 5-15; David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High-
Techmology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801, 820-22 (1998) (describing the relevance of Schum-
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product's value increases as the network grows." Observers generally agree that the
network-effects model characterizes the current market for computer operating
systems.'" As the benefits grow, it becomes more expensive for consumers to look
elsewhere, giving competition a winner-take-all flavor that makes early market
penetration a crucial competitive strategy. New entry requires either a better product
or a cost advantage that justifies the consumer's switching costs. To avoid falling
behind, businesses would have great incentive to take the early lead and hold it
through continuous product development."3 Thus, the market leader sets the tech-
nological standard, even if other approaches are superior. This may push subsequent
market innovation down the less-than-optimal path started by the market leader.'"
Innovation-based competition, on the other hand, views a technologically driven
market quite differently. Under this approach, subsequent innovation constantly
challenges and displaces market dominance. Firms compete for temporary market
leadership through creative destruction, giving competition an all-or-nothing flavor
in this organic, ongoing process." In such a market, periodic dominance by one
or just a few firms can reflect healthy, innovation-based competition and can be
subject to displacement even when network externalities are involved."'
Similarly, higher pricing may be necessary to induce the investment required for
peterian concepts in high-technology markets).
136. This network effect benefits society as well as individual consumers. The seminal work on
network effect is Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 16 (1974). For more current contributions in network externalities
literature, see Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics
in Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERsp. 117 (1994); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition
and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSp. 93 (1994); and Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4, at 4-6.
137. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law
and Economics of Exclusion, 7 Sup. Cr. ECON. REv. 157, 168 (1999) (stating that "[m]ost observers
seem to agree that network effects characterize the market for operating systems"). The most often-cited
historical example is the telephone system, which becomes more valuable to any one subscriber as others
subscribe and become part of the communications network. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4, at 5
(describing the telephone system as the "typical example" of network effect).
138. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4, at 9 (discussing the danger of competitors who might
"leapfrog" the incumbent lead position).
139. Of course, path dependency and lock-in can occur for reasons other than network externalities.
See id. at 10 (giving as an example the costs of learning to use a competing product).
140. Joseph Schumpeter, the distinguished creator of the creative destruction notion, once said:
[S]ince we are dealing with an organic process, analysis of what happens in any particular
part of it - say, in an individual concern or industry - may indeed clarify details of
mechanism but is inconclusive beyond that. Every piece of business strategy acquires its
true significance only against the background of that process and within the situation
created by it. It must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of creative destruction; it
cannot be understood irrespective of it or, in fact, on the hypothesis that there is a
perennial lull.
SCHUMPETER, supra note 135, at 83; see also Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4, at 11 (describing this
passage as "the most famous passage of Schumpeter's classic discussion on creative destruction").
141. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4, at 12 (stating that innovation-based competition
anticipates "periodic dominance by one firm or a few firms" and that in a healthy market "even goods
with network externalities are at issue").
[Vol. 54:285
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss2/3
MICROSOFT MERGERS AND MORE
developing new technology." Thus, companies participating in the new economy
understandably conclude that their only options are to monopolize the market or
lose it entirely."" Concerns exist that antitrust regulation of the new economic
marketplace would dangerously squelch high-tech creativity. Regulatory
proponents respond by pointing to antitrust law's long-standing posture of avoiding
unnecessary interference with incentives to innovate.'"
These two approaches suggest very different results regarding competition
protection in the new economy. The "network effects" view paints market
domination as especially dangerous, given its tendency to support inferior
technology over preferable alternatives. Innovation-based competition, on the other
hand, suggests the contrary - that market domination may be essential to success
in the modern marketplace.
3. New Entry and the New Economy
Defining competitive injury also involves the assessment of entry barriers. Most
conclude that companies wishing to enter today's high-tech industry face lowered
entry barriers;"" after all, successful entry largely depends upon possessing new
ideas rather than constructing a huge industrial plant. On the other hand, a
powerful competitor can use intellectual property protections such as patents and
copyrights to prevent entry by new rivals. Indeed, intellectual property is the
principal barrier new entrants must overcome in high-tech sectors.'
142. See id. (noting that in Schumpeterian competition, "pricing at a level higher than that found
under the theoretically simplistic case of perfect competition is not only legitimate, but also necessary
to induce investment in developing and deploying new technology"). In other words, to what extent
could IBM and Microsoft maintain market dominance without being displaced in their fast-paced
markets? As two commentators only recently noted:
It would ignore recent economic history to presume that Microsoft is immune from
being leapfrogged and displaced from its dominant market position. In hindsight it may
seem hard to understand how the Justice Department could have allowed itself to become
a latter day Captain Ahab, spending thirteen years in pursuit of a whale named IBM.
Though IBM was the undisputed market leader in mainframe computers in the 1960s, by
the time the government dropped its antitrust case in 1982, the mainframe had already
been harpooned by the personal computer. And in that market, despite its brand name and
experience, IBM emerged as just one of several strong competitors. In a competitive
economy, Schumpeter observed, businesses will be enticed to compete vigorously for
"spectacular prizes" despite the fact that "they receive in return only modest compen-
sation." In the analogous context of designing efficient regulatory regimes (as opposed
to efficient remedial regimes under antitrust law), the "most important" caveat for
policymakers is that "static models cannot be confidently relied on for quantitative
guidance in the real, dynamic world."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
143. See Dick Satran, Life After Microsoft: Do 20th-Century Laws Work in the 21st-Century
Economy?, SMART Bus., Oct. 2000, at 124 (concluding that "Microsoft's model for moving into a sector
of the Internet, though contentious and unfair, may also have been inevitable and necessary").
144. See Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 917-18 (describing how "antitrust has historically struck the
balance in favor of innovation").
145. See, e.g., id. at 916 (stating the "basic point that it is easier to become an applications
programmer and grow from that base than to design, finance, and construct a steel factory").
146. In fact, there is ongoing concern whether the balance between antitrust regulation and
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In addition, the previously described "network effect" also imposes a barrier to
entry. 4' A successful, early high-tech mover can threaten to become the only
supplier of certain products or services because of compatibility advantages that
stem from being part of the established network. Consumers become increasingly
committed to this mover because of their sunk costs, and suppliers of complemen-
tary products become similarly trapped within the network. Thus, the growing
impact of network effects makes market penetration especially difficult for new
entrants.'"
Thus, although commentators tend to agree that entry barriers, overall, may be
lower in the high-tech field, important barriers nonetheless do exist. It is,
therefore, difficult to predict to what extent modern market forces alone could
regulate monopolistic conduct. The changing face of competition pushes both
directions with respect to market entry barriers, both lowering and raising the bar
in differing respects.
IV. Microsoft Madness and the Big-Case Dilemma
A. The Big-Case, New-Technology Context
Antitrust enforcement is definitely on the move. The massive antitrust inves-
tigations and litigation of the present day not only reveal regulation in its most
public sense, but also magnify every aspect of its application. The "big cases"
have always been part of antitrust law in that antitrust cases are typically large in
terms of size, duration, and complexity. Both government and private actions
commonly extend ten years or beyond, requiring massive amounts of discovery.
The "big-case" problem has several significant implications. For example, such
cases provide the focus for important debate on antitrust law, its underlying
policies, its application, and the resources being devoted to enforcement.
Additionally, as "big cases" span large time periods, they naturally spawn
consideration of whether shifting technology (and markets) over that period support
continued enforcement or whether changing market forces themselves provide
better protection than government regulators.
Microsoft'49 is the most recent of these mega-cases. It is certainly significant
to the extent it has reawakened interest in the antitrust field. The Microsoft case
study may also inform the complex issues surrounding antitrust application in the
new millennium. Comparing the Microsoft experience with comparable antitrust
matters, especially cases reflecting "new technology" in their respective eras, may
be especially instructive in demonstrating whether Microsoft represents new
frailties in antitrust enforcement or simply represents another refrain in an old tune.
intellectual property protection has been properly struck. See id. at 919-23.
147. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
148. Antitrust Division Chief Joel Klein has described the strong presence of network effects as a
most novel phenomenon warranting increased antitrust concern. See Skitol, supra note 16, at 263
(quoting Joel Klein's discussion of this "opportunity for abuse").
149. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated and remanded,
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1301 (2001).
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B. Blast from the Past
1. Same Old, Same Old
Mega antitrust cases implicating the latest technology are not new. When the
government challenges America's biggest businesses, the public tends to react with
ambivalence; after all, it's one thing to champion competition, but quite another to
change a cherished institution.
The most ambitious antitrust divestiture of its era was the government's breakup
of Standard Oil in 191 1.' In that case, the Supreme Court itself observed that
the record was "inordinately voluminous, consisting of twenty-three volumes of
printed matter, aggregating about 12,000 pages, containing a vast amount of
confusing and conflicting testimony relating to innumerable, complex, and varied
business transactions, extending over a period of nearly forty years.'
The public's reaction to the Standard Oil prosecution was understandably mixed.
On the one hand, many were aghast that antitrust laws would undercut the most
successful and innovative enterprise of its time.'" On the other hand, more
people feared the enormous power that Standard Oil wielded and supported the
government's action.'
2. The AT&T Divestiture
The AT&T antitrust investigation was the next "big case" in the public eye. By
the time the Bell System was broken up in 1984," consumers were
bewildered."' After all, the public had grown less fearful of big business, and at
150. See generally Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
151. Id. at 30-31.
152. After all, Standard Oil was the company that had brought kerosene light into homes and had
developed the world-changing petroleum industry. See Skitol, supra note 16, at 260 (stating that "part
of the public was aghast at the notion that the antitrust laws would attack" this most prominent
company).
153. See id. (noting that a larger part of the public "cheered the Government on").
154. Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter was the architect of the AT&T divestiture. See
generally FRED W. HENCK & BERNARD STRASSBURG, A SLIPPERY SLOPE: THE LONG ROAD TO THE
BREAKUP OF AT&T 223 (1988) (calling Baxter "Mr. Justice Department where AT&T issues were
concerned"); Richard L. Schmalensee, Bill Baxter in the Antitrust Arena: An Economist's Appreciation,
51 STAN. L. REv. 1317, 1324-27 (1999) (noting Baxter's emphasis on pursuing only those cases
reflecting a "plausible and coherent consumer benefit rationale"). He came to Washington to fight
monopolies in 1981, then returned to teaching at Stanford University three years later. See Shelanski &
Sidak, supra note 4, at I (summarizing Baxter's involvement and economic views).
155. When the breakup occurred, the world changed:
A large part of the public found the drastic changes in the way they obtain telephone
service to be sudden and bewildering. More than a few have echoed the words of the
general manager of a National Basketball Association team. His club was widely reported,
on the eve of the annual draft of college players, to be negotiating a trade to improve its
position in the selection process. At the last minute, the deal fell apart. Asked why, he
said, "It all goes back to the breakup of the phone company. Nothing has worked right
since then."
HENCK & STRASSBERG, supra note 154, at ix (1988); see also STONE, supra note 30, at 9 (most of the
public did not support the divestiture).
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the time Bell was an unparalleled giant in our national economic. history." It
enjoyed a worldwide reputation of success in operating a model telephone
system.'" By January 1, 1984, 70% of Bell's assets had been divested, making
the divestiture the most colossal breakup of a corporate institution in American
history.""
The antitrust charges against AT&T occurred over three related sets of
proceedings.'" The most well-known case was the decision responsible for the
separation of local and long-distance phone service."W The interconnection nd
computer proceedings gave consumers the right to lease or own their own
equipment, while the MCI action led to the development of competition for long-
distance telephone service. 6 '
The Justice Department filed its antitrust suit in 1974, but that litigation's roots
extend back to the telephone's invention in 1876.62 The government argued that
AT&T had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing the markets for
long-distance telecommunications and telephone equipment. The Justice
Department contended that AT&T had systematically refused interconnection to its
long-distance competitors," had engaged in predatory long-distance pricing,'"
and had protected its monopoly position by abusing the regulatory process."
The AT&T suit ended with a consent decree, known as the Modification of
Final Judgment (MFJ),'" finalized in 1984.67 The principal structural remedy
156. Bell was an impressive colossus that dominated telecommunications:
Through its nationwide holding company, the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company, it owned or controlled the principal telephone company in each of the forty-
eight contiguous states, providing local and long distance services in their respective
territories. It handled almost all interstate long distance calls through the AT&T Long
Lines Department. Its manufacturing company, Western Electric, made most of the
country's telephone equipment and acted as the purchasing agent for items it did not itself
produce. Its parts included the leading U.S. industrial laboratory, the Bell Telephone
Laboratories. In short, it was the dominant technological and operating force in the
nation's telecommunications infrastructure.
HENCK & STRASSBURG, supra note 154, at x. By most measures, AT&T operated as the world's biggest
private corporation, having the most employees and often the highest gross revenues and net income.
See STONE, supra note 30, at 3 (calling AT&T "the largest corporation of any kind ever created");
HENCK & STRASSBURG, supra note 154, at x.
157. See STONE, supra note 30, at 4 ("Few would deny that at the time of divestiture the American
telecommunications network developed under AT&T's leadership was the best in the world."); cf. PETER
TEMIN & LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYsTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES AND POLITrCS 5
(1987) (noting systems failures in the late 1960s that had tarnished Bell's reputation as the best
telecommunications network in the world).
158. See HENCK & STRASSBURG, supra note 154, at x.
159. See STONE, supra note 30, at 5 (describing the three sets of proceedings).
160. United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981).
161. See STONE, supra note 30, at 5.
162. The telephone was invented amidst a bitter patent controversy. Id. at 7 (describing the alleged
patent fraud, but concluding that "the Bell patent was a deserved one").
163. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. at 1353-54.
164. Id. at 1356-57.
165. Id. at 1356.
166. The Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) was a consent decree in United States v. AT&T Co.,
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was a massive vertical divestiture requiring AT&T to spin off seven new regional
Bell operating companies from the company's local exchange operations.'
The complex divestiture process took two years to complete and had an initially
negative effect on consumers."6 Some contend that divestiture did not achieve
its primary aim - to separate the monopoly and competitive parts of telecom-
munications.17 Even those who were optimistic about the remedy's ultimate
wisdom conceded that the change created "an awful short-term problem."''
The MFJ is often credited with increasing competition in long-distance ser-
vices.' In fact, residential long-distance rates have fallen from thirty-five or
forty cents per minute in 1984 to discounted prices today of about five cents;
overall, long-distance service prices have averaged at least a 50% drop." In
addition, competition among long-distance providers did spur the rapid deployment
of fiberoptic cable, which later formed the infrastructure for handling the Internet's
data traffic.74 On the other hand, one could argue that these benefits might have
occurred notwithstanding the divestiture.7 The debate regarding the consequen-
552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The
consent decree modified a 1956 decree between the government and AT&T. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. at 135-
38 (describing the modification); see also United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cases (CCH)
68, 246 (D.N.Y. 1956) (original consent decree).
167. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 131 (Modification of Final Judgment).
168. Before divestiture, AT&T had three main parts: the local exchange companies providing about
80% of local telephone service; AT&T Long Lines, providing virtually all U.S. long-distance service;
and Western Electric, including Bell Laboratories, doing research and manufacturing almost all of
AT&Ts equipment. After divestiture, AT&T had to spin off its local exchange operations, creating seven
new regional Bell operating companies: Americtech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis,
Southwestern Bell, and U.S. West. Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4. at 92-93 (describing the AT&T
divestiture).
169. TEMIN & GALAMBOS, supra note 157, at xi (describing difficulties in obtaining repairs and a
rise in rates).
170. See id. at 354 (discussing the failure to create a "bright line" between monopoly and the
competitive portions of telecommunications).
171. See Linda Grant, Through a Glass Brightly: Consumers and the New Tomorrow, in
DISCONNECTING BELL: THE IMPACT OF THE AT&T DIVESTITURE 132, 133 (Harry M. Shooshan II ed.,
1984) (quoting Professor Harry Trebing, director of the Institute of Public Utilities at Michigan State
University).
172. Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4. at 94 ("The decree is often credited with furthering the
growth of competition in long-distance services.").
173. See id. (citing statistics flowing from divestiture).
174. See i.d (discussing how competition drove rapid deployment of fiberoptic cable).
175. One could explain these developments as follows:
Fiber deployment, for example, began prior to the MFJ. Although it would likely have
proceeded more slowly absent the decree's equal access rule that opened up long-distance
markets, the "fiber revolution" was under way prior to the decision to break up the Bell
System. For another example, the decline in long-distance prices is at least partly
attributable to regulatory decisions by the FCC relating to subsidy flows from long-
distance to local service. The FCC "rebalanced" local and long-distance rates by creating
a "subscriber line charge" ("SLC") on consumers' local bills to replace subsidies taken
from long-distance revenues. The effect of the SLC was to raise the customer's monthly
bill for exchange access and enable long-distance carriers to reduce rates accordingly ....
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ces of the AT&T divestiture remains substantial and unresolved. The MFJ may
well have produced net benefits; in any event, it did produce very high, unexpected
costs."76
3. The IBM Debacle
Ironically, on the same day the Justice Department announced the AT&T
divestiture, it also terminated the government's other major monopolization case
against "America's second titan of information technologies, IBM."'" United
States v. IBM' was one of the most significant single-firm monopoly cases of
all time." Like Microsoft, IBM involved one of the era's key technologically
progressive companies.t "
The IBM investigation began in 1967 after competitors complained of miscon-
duct.' The Justice Department brought suit during the Johnson administration's
final hours in January 1969; the case finally went to trial in 1975. In essence, the
government's case focused on IBM's marketing of an immensely popular family
of mainframe computers.'" Contending that IBM held about 74% of the market,
the government charged that the company maintained its monopoly power through
anticompetitive acts.' The principle claims were predatory pricing; illegally
Indeed, the FCC imposed price caps on the Bell operating companies in their sale of
access to interexchange carriers transporting interstate toll calls.
Id. at 94-95 (footnotes omitted).
176. Two commentators recently described the dangers associated with divestiture in technologically
dynamic industries in the following way:
[E]ven if the MFJ did produce net benefits, it also entailed very high, unanticipated costs.
The AT&T case shows not only that the predictions of antitrust litigants and judges about
the future of a technologically dynamic industry are often wrong, but also that enforcing
and interpreting a complex decree can be administratively costly and potentially harmful
to consumer welfare. The prospect of such costs counsels more caution than comfort in
adopting a structural remedy, and requires that a compelling case be made for the benefits
that society can expect from such relief.
Id. at 91.
177. See id. at I (describing the timing as appropriate, given Baxter's philosophy regarding antitrust
remedies); see also Ernest Holsendolph, U.S. Settles Phone Suit, Drops I.B.M. Case: A.T.&T. to Split
Up, Transforming Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1982, at Al.
178. United States v. Int. Bus. Mach. Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y. complaint filed Jan. 17,
1969).
179. FRANKLIN M. FISHER ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND
U.S. v. IBM 1 (1983) (calling this case "one of the great single-firm monopoly cases of all time").
Franklin Fisher testified as an expert witness for IBM at trial.
180. See id at I (describing IBM as the best-known and largest company in the computer industry,
which was "perhaps the most technologically progressive industry in the U.S. economy"). In fact, there
are many parallels between the Microsoft and IBM antitrust cases. See, e.g., Eliot G. Disner, Microsoft:
IBM Redux?, 8 Bus. L. TODAY 8, 11-12 (Sept.Oct. 1998); Dratler, supra note 18, at 677-81; Lopatka,
supra note 23, at 161.
181. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 179, at It (discussing the investigation's initiation); see also
Lopatka, supra note 23, at 146 (stating that IBM's competitors "egged on" the govemment).
182. This was the System/360 family of mainframe computers. See Lopatka, supra note 23, at 146-
47. For a description of the System/360's development, see Bob 0. Evans, System/360: A Retrospective
View, 8 ANNALS MIST. COMPUTING 155 (1986).
183. Interestingly, some argue that the Antitrust Division chose to focus on the company's monopoly
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bundling hardware, software, and support services; prematurely announcing new
products in order to injure competitors; and excluding peripheral equipment
manufacturers from the market.'"
The liability segment'" of the massive trial" lasted more than six years at
an enormous cost."' The case turned on proof of monopoly power and
exclusionary conduct. Both aspects were arguably flawed."' For example, the
market share statistics were distorted; at the very least, they did not accurately
reflect the narrowly defined market of firms manufacturing complete systems of
general-purpose computers." In the end, the Antitrust Division dismissed the
case, stipulating that it was "without merit.""9 The IBM experience has been
described as a grotesque waste of resources, offering valuable lessons largely
unlearned.' Even at that time, some suggested that antitrust laws were out of
touch with the "modern" economy." Instead of anticompetitive, IBM's conduct
may have actually been efficient in an innovative, high-technology market."
maintenance rather than IBM's acquisition of monopoly power because the government believed that
proving unlawful acquisition would simply have taken too long. See, e.g., Lewis Bernstein, Big Blue:
A Personal Reaction, ANTrrRuST, Winter 1988, at 40.
184. See Lopatka, supra note 23, at 147 (summarizing major claims against IBM).
185. The remedy phase was never tried.
186. The trial transcript was more than 104,400 pages long and thousands of documents were
admitted into evidence. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 179, at 1; see also Lopatka, supra note 23, at 145
(stating that the numbers surrounding the IBM investigation and trial "astound"). The case spanned five
presidents, nine attorneys general, and seven antitrust division chiefs. Only five of IBM's twenty-four
board directors remained at the end. See Donald I. Baker, Government Enforcement of§ 2, 61 NORE
DAME L. REv. 898, 899 n.13 (1986) (describing the enormity of the IBM investigation and trial).
187. The United States spent approximately $16.8 million, not including expert witness fees,
litigating the case, and IBM estimated the total annual cost to all parties as $50 million to $100 million.
See Post-Mortem on IBM Case Provides Forum for Conflicting Perspectives, 42 ANTITRuST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) 310, 311 (Feb. 11, 1982) (detailing litigation-related costs).
188. See Lopatka, supra note 23, at 147-48 (stating that "both parts of the government's case were
flawed" and flowed from a "big-is-bad" mentality).
189. See FISHER ETAL, supra note 179, at 44-97, 121-30 (discussing the government's market share
arguments).
190. See id. at 368-69 (setting forth the stipulation of dismissal in the appendix). So ended the
"Antitrust Division's Vietnam." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTiTRuST PARADOX 432 (rev. ed. 1993). Not
surprisingly, some members of the Antitrust Division criticized the dismissal, contending that the
government's prosecution was sound. See, e.g., RICHARD T. DELAMARTER, BIG BLUE 331, 336 (1986)
(author was a staff economist).
191. One commentator recently opined that the IBM case reflected the arrogant belief that antitrust
regulation can always improve upon market outcomes:
United States v. IBM is the greatest waste of resources in the history of antitrust
enforcement. Yet perhaps, in the larger order of things, something good has to come from
something so grotesque. And, in truth, IBM offers valuable lessons. Some of them seem
to have been learned. But, above all, the case reflected an arrogance toward the market.
a conviction that antitrust institutions are fully capable of improving on market outcomes
wherever imperfections can be alleged. An appropriate respect for the market, or
equivalently a healthy distrust of the capacity of antitrust, has proven elusive.
Lopalka, supra note 23, at 146.
192. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 179, at I (citing Lester Thurow in the New York Times).
193. As one commentator recently noted:
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Some contend that the government's failure in the IBM case led to long-term
demoralization inhibiting regulation of concentrated industries.s As for BM
itself, its fortunes declined during the dozen years of fighting." Over the same
period, IBM also lost dominance because it abandoned the cutting edge of
innovative activity.'"
C. Microsoft Madness
1. In the Public Spotlight
Microsoft's legal entanglements with the Justice Department have captured the
public's imagination"' more than any other antitrust controversy in recent
times.'" In some respects, the government's initiative was even more ambitious
IT]he practices were, in general, efficient responses to consumer demand and the actions
of competitors. They were, unquestionably, undertaken by IBM to retain its leading
position in the marketplace, but there is nothing wrong with that. And to the extent that
IBM also sought to exploit any market power it had lawfully obtained, there is nothing
wrong with that either. As Robert Bork observed, "There was no sensible explanation for
IBM's dominance in the computer industry at the time other than superior efficiency ...
Lopatka, supra note 23, at 148 (footnote omitted).
194. When the government sued IBM in 1969, the computer industry presented a "textbook example
of an innovative market." See id. at 154-55 (describing computer innovations throughout the relevant
period).
195. See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 26, at 1105 (providing the history of the IBM case and detailing
the subsequent demoralization of efforts to deal with concentrated industries).
1%. See CHARLES FERGUSON & CHARLES MORRIS, COMPUTER WARS (1993) (calling the IBM case
a "devouring monster"); THOMAS J. WATSON, JR., FATHER, SON & Co.: MY LIFE AT IBM AND BEYOND
(1990) (describing how the antitrust case colored everything the company's management did); William
J. Cook, Antitrust Crippled Big Blue in the 1970s, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 1. 1998, at 42
(stating that "the world's most successful computer company lost its way" during the antitrust suit).
197. See Dratler, supra note 18, at 674 n.12 (declaring that IBM became a "stagnant noncompetitor"
and "allowed the P.C. industry to emerge at its feet, and it turned itself from a paragon of financial
reliability into a company that for several years was losing money at a frightening rate"); Lopatka, supra
note 23, at 158 (concluding that "[w]hen IBM failed to embrace the movement toward distributed
computing and personal computers... it lost its position").
198. In a fitting twist, the public has had extensive Internet access to the case. Testimony, filings,
orders, and other information are available at http:lwww.usdoj.gov/atrlcaseslmsindex.htm (last visited
Aug. 6, 2001) (Antitrust Division) and http'//www.microsoft.com/presspass/tria/default.htm (last visited
Aug. 6, 2001).
199. Richard Steuer, the editorial chair of Antitrust, described the furor as follows:
In the court of public opinion antitrust law is judged on the basis of its big cases, and
in this era the case is Microsoft.
Whatever one thinks of the Microsoft case, it has enlivened popular interest in antitrust
law like nothing else. Today, antitrust is being discussed and debated in board rooms,
classrooms, and courtrooms across America. It has been the subject of unprecedented
press coverage and commentary. Microsoft is the story of the day ....
Steuer, supra note 4, at 5; see also JOEL BRINKLEY & STEVE LOHR, U.S. v. MICROSOFr: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE LANDMARK CASE xiii (2001) ("The New York Times viewed the Microsoft case as a
touchstone millennial event that signaled a transition from business-as-usual at the end of the 20th
century to seemingly limitless global markets at the beginning of the 21st."); Lopatka & Page, supra note
137, at 159 ("After decades of obscurity, antitrust has returned to the headlines.").
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here than in the IBM and AT&T cases because the government filed the latter
actions when the public had a strong faith in antitrust enforcement.' ° The
Microsoft controversy is an area in which neutrality is practically impossible.
Everyone has an opinion about the company's state of grace, and that opinion is
likely to be given long and loud. °'
The personality of Microsoft's former CEO Bill Gates has further polarized these
views.' Gates, an author himself,' has been revered for his godlike business
sense and ridiculed for his nerdish and egotistical personal traits.' Simul-
200. One commentator has compared the relevant antitrust enforcement climates in the following
fashion:
The government's May 1998 antitrust filing against Microsoft represents the most
ambitious antitrust initiative in a generation, easily comparable to the IBM and AT&T
cases. Indeed, the case against Microsoft is more ambitious. The Department of Justice
(DOJ) filed the IBM and AT&T cases when faith in antitrust was strong, when breaking
up General Motors and major oil firms represented serious policy options. In recent years,
however, activist trust-busting has fallen into disrepute, and the large-firm monopolization
case has become a rarity. Thus, DOJ's case against Microsoft represents a potential shift
in policy, a possible return to the antitrust activism of the 1960s and 1970s, especially in
light of DOJ's April 2000 brief urging Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson to impose
divestiture on Microsoft.
George Bittlingmayr, U.S. v. Microsoft: Cui Bono?, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 9 (1999)
(footnotes omitted).
201. See generally Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4, at I (describing Microsoft as "a post-industrial
giant that has been alternately lionized, vilified, and, ultimately, investigated and prosecuted by the
Antitrust Division"); Robert Reno, Pick a Side, Any Side, in the Microsoft Fight, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
May 9, 2000, at AI I (stating that the "best minds" can't decide which side to take in the Microsoft case).
But see Paul Krugman, The Case Against Anti-Microsoft: Punitive Action Will Be Worse - It Will Create
a Climate of Fear, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 11, 2000, at Alt (noting that no one outside Seattle
is pro-Microsoft, but that "a lot of us are, at least mildly, anti-anti-Microsoft"). Angry rivals have debased
Microsoft's undeniable successes through the years with colorful nicknames:
Godzilla, snake, bear, jackal, eight-hundred-pound gorilla, the Beast of Redmond, Don
Corleone, the Great Satan, the Borg, the Leviathan, the Antichrist, the Prince of Darkness,
the Dorsal Fin, a twenty-first-century Robber Baron, the "Leona Helmsley of technology,"
the Chinese Army, Darth Vader, the Evil Empire, the Death Star ....
DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE SILICON BOYS AND THEIR VALLEY OF DREAMS 255-56 (1999).
202. In January 2000, Bill Gates promoted Steve Ballmer, long known as Microsoft's chief salesman,
to CEO. Gates remains with Microsoft as chairman and chief software architect. See Elizabeth Corcoran,
No More Mr. Bad Guy, FORBES, Mar. 5, 2001, at 130 (describing management changes at Microsoft);
Michael Cusumano, Gates-Ballmer Shuffle Is a Boost for Microsoft, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 31, 2000,
2000 WL 2175652 (stating that "Gates remains the technology guru and strategy genius" after Balmer
became CEO); Andrew Zajac & Matt Rosenberg, Ballmers Windows Seat May Get Hot: New Microsoft
CEO Faces Curse of Gates, CHI. TRiB., Jan. 23, 2000, 2000 WL 3629322 (contrasting styles of Gates
and Balmer).
203. See, e.g., BILL GATES & COLLINS HEMINGWAY, BUSINESS @ THE SPEED OF THOUGHT: USING
A DIGITAL NERVOUS SYSTEM (1999); BILL GATES ET AL, THE ROAD AHEAD (rev. ed. 1996).
204. See, e.g., SIMON CHARNAN, BILL GATES: HELPING PEOPLE USE COMPUTERS (1997) (children's
book in "Community Builders" series); DES DEARLOVE, BUSINESS THE BILL GATES WAY: 10 SECRETS
OF THE WORLD'S RICHEST BUSINESS LEADER (1999); JOAN D. DICKINSON, BILL GATES: BILLIONAIRE
COMPUTER GENIUS (1997); STEVEN FERRY, THE STORY OF MICRoSoFr (2000) (part of the "Spirit of
Success" series); ROBERT HELLER, BILL GATES (2000) (part of "Business Masterminds" series); RAMA
D. JAGER, IN THE COMPANY OF GIANTS: CANDID CONVERSATIONS WITH THE VISIONARIES OF THE
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taneously hated and adored,' he has been the focus of numerous biographical
treatments describing his Microsoft journey.' His company's antitrust woes have
also increasingly been the subject of popular works.'
DIGITAL WORLD (1997); DANIEL ICHBIAH & SUSAN L. KNEPPER, THE MAKING OF MICROSOFT: How
BILL GATES AND His TEAM CREATED THE WORLD'S MOST SUCCESSFUL SOFTWARE COMPANY (1991)
(originally published in 1989 under the title NEW MAGICIANS); GENE N. LANDRUM, PROFILES OF
GENIUS: THIRTEEN CREATIVE MEN WHO CHANGED THE WORLD (1993) (describing William Gates Ill
as one of thirteen geniuses); JANEr C. LOWE, BILL GATES SPEAKS: INSIGHT FROM THE WORLD'S
GREATEST ENTREPRENEUR (1998).
205. As for Bill Gates' enormous ego, the following joke makes the point:
Al Gore, Bill Clinton, and Bill Gates find themselves in Heaven standing before God,
who is sitting in a beautiful white throne. And God asks Gore, "What do you believe in?"
"I believe that CFCs are killing the Earth, and that until this is corrected, the ozone
layer depletion and greenhouse effect imperils all of humanity."
And God says, "Okay, you can sit at my feet."
God then asks Clinton, "What do you believe in?"
"I believe that all people are equal and everyone should be able to live their lives as
they see fit. I believe in empowerment to the people and freedom for all."
And God says, "Okay, you can also sit at my feet."
God then asks Bill Gates, "And what do you believe in?"
Bill Gates replies, "I believe you're sitting in my chair."
GARY RIVLIN, THE PLOT TO GET BILL GATES: AN IRREVERENT INVESTIGATION OF THE WORLD'S
RICHEST MAN ... AND THE PEOPLE WHO HATE HiM 336 (1999) (appendix contains "A Compendium
of Bill Gates and Microsoft Jokes"); see also HENRY BEARD, JOHN BOSWELL & RON BARRETT, BILL
GATES' PERSONAL SUPER SECRET PRIVATE LAPTOP: A MICROSPOOF (1998); ROBERT X. CRINGELY,
ACCIDENTAL EMPIRES: How THE BOYS OF SILICON VALLEY MAKE THEIR MILLIONS, BATrLE FOREIGN
COMPETITION, AND STILL CAN'T GET A DATE (1992) (including a chapter on "Chairman Bill"); BILL G.,
THE SECRET DIARY OF BILL GATES: A PARODY (1998).
206. E.g., Paul Farhi, Bill Gates Brought Us What We Secretly Adore, STAR TRiB. (Minneapolis),
Nov. 10, 1999, at A21 (stating that Bill Gates is a "great American" and "a capitalist pig").
207. See, e.g., PAUL ANDREWS, How THE WEB WAS WON: MICROSOFT FROM WINDOWS TO THE
WEB: THE INSIDE STORY OF How BILL GATES AND HIS BAND OF INTERNET IDEALISTS TRANSFORMED
A SOFTWARE EMPIRE (1999); AARON BOYD, SMART MONEY: THE STORY OF BILL GATES (1995);
JONATHAN GATLIN, BILL GATES: THE PATH TO THE FUTURE (1999); DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE SILICON
BOYS AND THEIR VALLEY OF DREAMS (1999) (described on jacket sleeve as a "riotous romp through the
history and culture of [Silicon] Valley"); JEANNE M. LEINSKI, BILL GATES (2000); STEPHEN MANES &
PAUL ANDREWS, GATES: How MICROSOFf'S MOGUL REINVENTED AN INDUSTRY - AND MADE HIMSELF
THE RICHEST MAN IN AMERICA (1992); RANDALL E. STROSS, THE MICROSOFT WAY: THE REAL STORY
OF How THE COMPANY OUTSMARTS ITS COMPETITION (1996); JAMES WALLACE, OVERDRIVE: BILL
GATES AND THE RACE TO CONTROL CYBERSPACE (1997); JAMES WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD
DRIVE: BILL GATES AND THE MAKING OF THE MICROSOFT EMPIRE (1992).
208. DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1999); COMPETITION,
INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST, in THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE (Jeffrey A.
Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999); KEN AULETFA, WORLD WAR 3.0: MICROSOFT AND ITS
ENEMIES (2001); BRINKLEY & LOHR, supra note 199; JOHN HEILEMANN, PRIDE BEFORE THE FALL: THE
TRIALS OF BILL GATES AND THE END OF THE MICROSOFT ERA (2001); DAVID B. KOPEL, ANTITRUST
AFTER MICROSOFT: THE OBSOLESCENCE OF ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL ERA (2000); STANLEY J.
LIEsOwr'z & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST
IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1999); MCKENzIE, supra note 126.
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2. The Investigation Begins
Microsoft's antitrust problems began eleven years ago when the FTC started an
investigation of Microsoft's business practices.' In 1993, the FTC dropped its
inquiry after the commissioners deadlocked 2-2 on filing charges."' The
Department of Justice, however, decided to take up its own investigation. 2t" The
Justice Department and Microsoft signed a consent decree in 1994,"' but Judge
Stanley Sporkin threw out the decree the following year, finding the arrangement
to be too lenient on Microsoft.213 Two months later, the parties went back to
court when the Justice Department sued Microsoft to block its proposed $1.5
billion acquisition of Intuit, the developer of the leading personal finance program,
Quicken.' Microsoft quickly dropped its plans to acquire Intuit.2 '5 In June
1995, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed Judge Sporkin's rejection
of the consent decree and removed him from the case;"' Judge Thomas Penfield
Jackson subsequently approved the consent decree.1
In September 1996, the Justice Department initiated an investigation into
Microsoft's bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows 95, viewing it as a
209. On May 30, 1990, the FTC started investigating Microsoft's possible collusion with IBM in
the development of OS/2, its Windows pricing policy, and its competitive advantage in Windows
applications. See generally Jim Erickson, When Microsoft Plays Hardball: Fair or Foul? Federal Probe
Shinew Spotlight on Computer Giant, SEATrL- POST-INTELUIGENCER, Mar. 16, 1991, at AI (discussing
the FTC investigation). For a helpful chronology of key events in the Microsoft antitrust saga, see
MCKENZE, supra note 126, at 231-33 (Appendix I).
210. See generally FTC Still Split on Microsoft: No Antitrust Ruling Issued, but Firm Says Probe
Is Continuing, SEATrLE PosT-INTEL.IGENCER, July 22, 1993, at Al (stating that a deadlocked FTC
declined to issue an antitrust complaint against Microsoft).
211. See T.R. Reid & Brit Hume, Antitrust Case Hardball Issue for Microsoft, SEATrLE POsT-
INTFLLIGENCER, Aug. 14, 1993, at B3 (describing how the FTC "handed the matter off to the Justice
Department").
212. See G. Pascal Zachary, A Winning Deal: Microsoft Will Remain Dominant Despite Pact in
Antitrust Dispute, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1994, at AI (describing the settlement).
213. See Christopher Hanson & Jim Erickson, Microsoft Antitrust Pact Rejected: Justice Settlement
Isn't in "Public Interest, " Judge Rules, SEATr POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 15, 1995, at AI (calling the
holding a "stunning decision").
214. Since Microsoft already owned Money, Quicken's principal competitor, the Justice Department
charged that Microsoft would have a monopoly in the personal finance software market.
215. See G. Christian Hill et al., Undone Deal: Microsoft Drops Bid for Intuit, WALL ST. J., May
22, 1995, at Al (describing this "Round Two" victory for the Justice Department).
216. See Christopher Hanson, Court Backs Microsoft Settlement: Judge Sporkin Is Rebuked for
Rejecting Antitrust Pact, SEATrL POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 17, 1995 (calling this a major victory for
Microsoft).
217. See Jim Erickson, Microsoft Antitrust Decree Is Finally OK'd: Justice Department Approved
Deal 13 Months Ago, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGFNCER, Aug. 22, 1995, at A l (describing approval of the
"controversial agreement"). Many criticized this consent decree as too weak. See Norman W. Hawker,
Consistently Wrong: The Single Product Issue and the Tying Claims Against Microsoft, 35 CAL. W. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1998) (noting that "the consent decree was widely criticized as too weak"). See generally
Kenneth C. Baseman et al., Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Technical
Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating System Software, 40 ANTITRUST
BULL. 265, 299 (1995) (describing consent decree remedies as likely inadequate).
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possible extension of Microsoft's monopoly in the operating system market into the
browser market. The following August, the federal government expanded its
inquiry to include Microsoft's extensive investment in Apple Computers and in
three firms providing video and sound over the Internet. The Justice Department
brought suit against Microsoft for bundling Internet Explorer with Windows in
violation of the 1995 consent decree.2 On December 11, 1997, Judge Jackson
issued a preliminary injunction preventing Microsoft from requiring personal
computer manufacturers to install Internet Explorer as a condition for using
Windows 95."" While appealing the injunction, Microsoft offered two versions
of Windows 95, one with and one without Internet Explorer. The Justice
Department sought to have Microsoft held in contempt for violating Judge
Jackson's order.
Microsoft and the Justice Department, in January 1998, signed an agreement
under which personal computer manufacturers would not have to place the Internet
Explorer icon on the Windows 95 desktop.' Despite Judge Jackson's injunction,
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that Microsoft's launch of
Windows 98, in June 1998, could go forward with its integrated Internet Explorer
browser because Windows 98 fell outside the district court order.Y'
3. The Instant District Court Action
On May 18, 1998, the U.S. Justice Department announced a new suit against
Microsoft' for using its monopoly power in the operating system market to stifle
competition in the Internet browser market. Twenty state attorneys general and the
District of Columbia also sued Microsoft, asserting federal antitrust law violations,
as well as violations of the states' respective antitrust regulations.' Upon
218. See Bryan Gruley et al., U.S. Sues Microsoft Over PC Browser, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1997,
at A3 (stating that the Justice Department filed a complaint "aiming squarely at the heart of the software
giant's strategy for dominance").
219. See John R. Wilke & Don Clark, Microsoft Is Dealt a Blow on Internet Plans, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 12, 1997, at A3 (describing the judge's decision as "at least a temporary blow to the software giant's
plans").
220. See David Bank & John R. Wilke, Browser Bruiser: Microsoft and Justice End a SkirmLih,
Yet War Could Escalate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1998, at Al (explaining that Microsoft agreed to
unbundle Internet software to settle the legal skirmish).
221. This was a stunning development. For many, Microsoft's claim that Windows 95 and Internet
Explorer constituted a single integrated product was obviously unsupportable. See, e.g., James Gleick,
Justice Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997, at40 (Magazine) (calling Microsoft's position "transparently
untrue"); Wait Mossberg, Knowing the ABCs of the Antitrust Case Againist Microsoft, WALL ST. J., Oct.
30, 1997, at BI (concluding that Internet Explorer was not an integrated feature of Windows 95).
222. Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18,
1998) [hereinafter U.S. Complaint]. See generally John R. Wilke, U.S. Sues Microsoft on Antitrust
Grounds, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1998, at A3 (stating that the suit "goes to the heart of Microsoft's way
of doing business"). Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein was the moving force in bringing suit.
Although his motivations in pursuing Microsoft have sometimes been questioned, Klein generally garners
considerable respect. See BRINKLEY & LOHR, supra note 199, at 29-31 (containing a segment entitled
"Joel Klein: At the Helm").
223. Complaint, New York v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.D.C. filed May 18,
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Microsoft's motion,' Judge Jackson' consolidated the state and federal
actions. On June 23, the federal appellate court overturned that judge's
December 11 order enjoining Microsoft from requiring computer manufacturers to
couple Internet Explorer with Windows 95.
In essence, the Department of Justice and the States contended that Microsoft
had purposefully engaged in improper conduct involving competitors, distributors
of Internet browsers, and computer manufacturers to preserve Microsoft's
dominance in the personal computer operating systems22 market and to extend
that monopoly to the Internet browser market.m In violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, Microsoft allegedly entered into certain exclusive dealing and tying
arrangements.' In violation of section 2, Microsoft purportedly engaged in this
same and other behavior to maintain its monopoly power in the operating systems
market and to attempt monopoly status in the Internet browser market.'
The government based its case on the contention that Microsoft enjoyed
monopoly power in the operating systems market for Intel-based personal
1998). The twenty states participating with the District of Columbia were California, Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
North Carolina, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
On July 17, 1998, these plaintiffs submitted a revised complaint. Revised Complaint, New York v.
Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.D.C. filed July 17, 1998) [hereinafter State Complaint).
South Carolina withdrew on December 7, 1998. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4, at n.230
(mentioning the State's withdrawal). Some contend that the presence of so many attorneys general
bolstered the Justice Department's decision to bring its action and maintain an aggressive stance. See
Sensenbrenner: Antitrust Overhaul Due, supra note 14 (stating House Judiciary Committee Chairman
Sensenbrenner's belief that "the Justice Department and Microsoft were within a few words of reaching
a settlement until the state attorneys general came in and said, 'No deal'"); Foer, supra note 4, at 1284
(noting that some observers hold this same view); Robert M. Longer, Should the Antitrust Division, the
FTC, and State Attorneys General Formally Allocate the Market for Antitrust Enforcement?, ANTmTRUsT
REP., Oct. 1998, at 2 (discussing the relationship between state and federal enforcement efforts).
224. See Motion of Defendant Microsoft Corporation to Consolidate, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 21, 1998).
225. Judge Jackson has achieved an intriguing infamy as a result of handling this matter. See, e.g.,
BRINKLEY & LOHR, supra note 199, at 17-21 (containing a segment entitled "Thomas Penfield Jackson:
A Judge from Central Casting").
226. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232, slip op. at I (D.D.C. May 22,
1998). In this order, Judge Jackson also invoked the long-standing acceleration provisions of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2) to advance the date of full trial and consolidate it with a hearing on the
government's motion for a preliminary injunction. See Andrew I. Gavil, The End of Antitrust Trench
Warfare?: An Analysis of Some Procedural Aspects of the Microsoft Trial, 13 ANTITRUST 7, 7 (Summer
1999) (describing the ramifications flowing from Judge Jackson's May 22 order). See generally I IA
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2950 (1995)
(describing the operation of FRCP 65(a)(2)).
227. As the United States explained in its complaint, an operating system coordinates the
interactions between a personal computer's central processing functions and its hardware components,
as well as providing a platform for software applications. See U.S. Complaint, supra note 222, 7 54,
66.
228. See id. '1 1-38, 53-123; State Complaint, supra note 223, 1I 9-78.
229. See U.S. Complaint, supra note 222, 1 130-37; State Complaint, supra note 223, 'ft 93-97.
230. See U.S. Complaint, supra note 222, 't 138-41; State Complaint, supra note 223, II 85-90.
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computers, the most widely used personal computers in the United States."'
According to the United States, Microsoft retained monopoly power because
original equipment manufacturers had no commercially viable alternative to
Microsoft's Windows. No reasonable alternative was available, the government
urged, because the operating systems market had high entry barriers resulting from
network effects and economies of scale in software production.'
After rejecting Microsoft's motion to dismiss, the infamous Microsoft trial began
before Judge Jackson on October 19, 1998, and continued for seventy-six days.
From the moment the Microsoft case was filed, Judge Jackson faced the challenge
of avoiding the protracted proceedings that had mired prior government
monopolization actions such as IBM and AT&T."3 The deposition testimony
alone in Microsoft ran into the tens of thousands of pages.'
4. Judge Jackson's Rulings
On November 5, 1999, Judge Jackson issued his findings of fact, 5 overwhel-
mingly endorsing the government's position. The judge found that Microsoft held
monopoly power in the Intel-compatible personal computer operating systems
product market,' and that Microsoft demonstrated this power through its pricing
policies for Windows." As for Microsoft's conduct over the past decade, Judge
Jackson concluded that these actions gave Microsoft an advantage only "if they
operated to reinforce monopoly power.""3 Although some procompetitive benefits
flowed from these acts, the judge agreed with the government that, on balance, the
conduct harmed consumers by inhibiting competition and innovation in the
computer industry. " '
231. See U.S. Complaint, supra note 222, 'ff 1-6, 57-60. Microsoft's Windows product was the
operating system in over 80% of existing Intel-based personal computers and was going into more than
90% of new personal computers. See id. 1 2.
232. The Department of Justice explained that a successful operating system had to support
numerous desirable software applications and that software writers, in turn, would create new applications
to run on well-received operating systems. The more widely used the operating system, the more
desirable the system would become to consumers. See id. 2-3, 57-60,66-68. The presence of network
externalities and increasing returns to scale in the software industry had been acknowledged in prior
litigation involving the Department of Justice and Microsoft. See United States v. Microsoft, 147 F.3d
935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describing the software industry as possessing such attributes); United States
v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("It is undisputed that the software market is
characterized by 'increasing returns,' resulting in natural barriers to entry.").
233. See Gavil, supra note 226 (exploring the procedural devices used to move the case from filing
to judgment in far less time than might have been expected).
234. See Joel Brinkley, Read All About It: Testimony Omitted from Microsoft Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1999, at C6.
235. United States v. Microsoft Corp. 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999).
236. See id at 18-66.
237. Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft wielded monopoly power because it could charge
higher than competitive prices for Windows, and that the company could do so for a sustained period
without losing a significant number of customers. See id. at 19, 33.
238. See id at 28, 167.
239. See id. at 110-12, 9n 408-12.
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On April 3, 2000, Judge Jackson issued his conclusions of law.'n He
concluded that Microsoft violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by tying its web
browser to its operating system and that the company violated section 2 when it
"maintained its monopoly power by anticompetitive means and attempted to
monopolize the Web browser market."'"
As for the tying arrangement, Judge Jackson decided that "Microsoft's com-
bination of Windows and Internet Explorer by contractual and technological
artifices constitute[d] unlawful tying to the extent that those actions forced
Microsoft's customers and consumers to take Internet Explorer as a condition of
obtaining Windows."2" Even though Microsoft essentially priced Internet
Explorer at "zero," the judge concluded that "consumers were forced to pay, one
way or another, for the browser along with Windows."2"
With respect to section 2, Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft failed to rebut
the presumption of monopoly power created under the facts 2' The court em-
phasized that "there are currently no products - and that there are not likely to
be any in the near future - that a significant percentage of computer users
worldwide could substitute for Intel-compatible PC operating systems without
incurring substantial costs."" The judge noted that the plaintiffs had proved
Microsoft's dominant, persistent, and increasing share of the relevant market, which
exceeded 95% of the worldwide market.2
With monopoly power established, Judge Jackson focused on Microsoft's use of
anticompetitive methods to achieve or maintain its position, deciding as a threshold
question whether defendant's conduct was "exclusionary."' The judge examined
Microsoft's conduct with respect to middleware technologies2" and concluded that
the company strove for years to prevent these technologies "from fostering the
development of enough full-featured, cross-platform applications to erode the
applications barrier."" In sum, the judge deemed Microsoft's campaign illegally
anticompetitive because the campaign prevented the middleware technologies from
240. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
241. See id. at 35. Judge Jackson did, however, find in Microsoft's favor with respect to the
govcrnment's allegation of illegal exclusive dealing arrangements. See id.
242. Id. at 47.
243. Id. at 50.
244. L at 36-37. Microsoft "attempted to rebut the presumption of monopoly power with evidence
of both putative constraints on its ability to exercise such power and behavior of its own that [was]
supposedly inconsistent with the possession of monopoly power." Id. at 37. The court concluded,
however, that the purported constraints did not actually deprive Microsoft of its monopoly power and
that the company's conduct (technical innovation and reasonable pricing behavior) was not inconsistent
with its possession of monopoly power. See id.
245. Id. at 36.
246. See id..
247. By "exclusionary," Judge Jackson meant whether the conduct had "restricted significantly the
ability of other firms to compete." d at 37.
248. Judge Jackson focused on Netscape's Navigator Web browser and Sun's implementation of Java
technology - "the two incarnations of middleware that posed the greatest threat." Id. at 39.
249. Id. at 38.
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fulfilling their potential on the open market without procompetitive justification.'
In so concluding, Judge Jackson emphasized the importance of viewing Microsoft's
conduct in totality:
Microsoft's campaign to protect the applications barrier from erosion by
network-centric middleware can be broken down into discrete categories
of activity, several of which on their own independently satisfy the second
element of a § 2 monopoly maintenance claim. But only when the
separate categories of conduct are viewed, as they should be, as a single,
well-coordinated course of action does the full extent of the violence that
Microsoft has done to the competitive process reveal itself. In essence,
Microsoft mounted a deliberate assault upon entrepreneurial efforts that,
left to rise or fall on their own merits, could well have enabled the
introduction of competition into the market for Intel-compatible PC
operating systems.'
According to the court, the surrounding context only reinforced its conclusion that
Microsoft's conduct was "predacious."'  Using the same evidence, Judge Jackson
also found that Microsoft had violated section 2 by attempting to monopolize a second
market - the Internet browser market.' Once Judge Jackson had completed the
trial's liability phase,' the district court considered the appropriate remedy. The
government sought a structural injunction requiring vertical divestiture of Microsoft
into two separate companies - one to handle the operating systems business and one
engaged in applications. 5  Microsoft responded with a proposal for behavioral
restrictions.' After a brief hearing, Judge Jackson ordered Microsoft to submit a
proposed plan dividing the company vertically into two firms.'
5. The Appeal and Microsoft's Legacy
The court of appeals heard oral argument in the Microsoft matter at the end of
February, and will likely issue a decision later this year. Judge Jackson himself
250. See id. at 39.
251. Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
252. Id.
253. See id. at 45-46.
254. Judge Jackson had bifurcated the case into separate liability and remedies phases shortly after
the complaints were filed. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4, at 73.
255. See Plaintiffs Revised Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action
No. 98-1232, 2 (D.D.C. filed May 26, 2000).
256. See Microsoft Corporation's Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil
Action No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2000).
257. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59,63 (D.D.C. 2000) (stating "Microsoft
shall submit to the Court and the Plaintiffs a proposed plan of divestiture").
258. This article reflects research through March 2001. On June 28, the court of appeals issued its
decision, partly affirming and partly reversing Judge Jackson. Upholding Microsoft's monopolization
liability, the appellate court found no illegal attempted monopolization and remanded for a determination
of whether the tying claim constitutes a violation under a rule-of-reason analysis. Rebuking Judge
Jackson for his public comments, the court disqualified him from hearing the remand. See United States
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became an issue before the appellate court' The seven-judge appeals court harshly
questioned the government's position ' and launched a blistering attack on Judge
Jackson's public statements about Microsoft as a breach of judicial decorum and
perhaps even judicial ethics.2" Given the oral argument's tenor, many concluded that
Microsoft had a good chance of prevailing on at least some aspects of its appeal. '
Some believe that George W. Bush, who stands "on the side of innovation, not
litigation,"'' will drop the Justice Department's antitrqst suit against Microsoft,
should the company prevail on this appeal.'
Those who strongly dispute the governments case in United States v. Microsoft do
so on several grounds. One popular complaint is that Microsoft does not and cannot
maintain monopoly market leadership because of the extraordinarily competitive
market within which it operates.'  This argument closely relates to the overall
v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
259. Justice Jackson said of his own findings, "Virtually everything I did may be vulnerable on
appeal .... " Peter Spiegel, Microsoft Judge Defends HimselfAgainst Charges of Misconduct: Software
Giant Appeals Judge's Breakup Judgment, FIN. TIMES 4 (Oct. 7,2000); Michael A. Cusumano, An Angry
Judge Won't Help Teach Microsoft the Law, WASH. PosT, Nov. 28, 1999, at B4 (taking position that
Judge Jackson's "findings of fact" were one-sided and revealing of his anger toward Microsoft).
260. In order to prevail, the government has to win on at least one of three legal theories: illegal
tying of the Internet browser to the Windows operating system; attempted monopolization of the browser
market; or the monopoly maintenance claim. After February's oral arguments, antitrust commentators
believe the first two claims "don't have a chance," and the third may be doubtful. See, e.g., Dan Carney
et al., Reversal of Misfortune?, Bus. WK., Mar. 12, 2001, at 48, available at 2001 WL 2205855
(describing the reactions of antitrust experts to the oral argument). It has been suggested that the Bush
administration helped sink the government's case on appeal by ousting Douglas Malemed, acting head
of the Antitrust Division, shortly before oral argument. See Dan Carney, Did Microsoft Catch a Break?,
Bus. WK., Mar. 12, 2001, at 14, available at 2001 WL 2205834 (stating that ill-prepared Department
of Justice lawyers could not answer basic questions and confused important precedents).
261. David Greising, Insider's Take on Microsoft Meltdown: An Intriguing Look at Plot to Get
"Beast," Cmt, TRIB., Mar. 11, 2001, at I (declaring that Judge Jackson "was beaten to a pulp before
dozens of shocked witnesses" and that Jackson's public statement rendered the proceedings a "sham");
Adam Rogers, It's Still Alive! The Company's Appeal Focuses on the Trial Judge's Missteps, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 12, 2001, at 68, 2001 WL 7292924 (stating that the appellate court "got hottest" over the speeches
and interviews Jackson gave regarding the trial). In a subsequent proceeding in an unrelated matter,
Judge Jackson proclaimed that any appearance of personal bias directly resulted from Microsoft's
misconduct. See John R. Wilke, Judge Jackson Issues Blast at Microsoft As He Pulls Out of
Discrimination Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2001, at B5 (describing Judge Jackson's "blistering attack"
on Microsoft).
262. See Rogers, supra note 261 (stating that "Microsoft could possibly win it all"); Carney et al.,
supra note 260, at 48 (predicting that there is now a reasonable prospect that Microsoft will prevail);
Greising, supra note 261 (noting that Judge Jackson's lower ruling would likely see major revisions
before the appellate court).
263. George W. Bush made this comment during a 2000 campaign appearance in Washington, home
of Microsoft's headquarters. Donald Lambro, Bush Said Unlikely to Pursue Microsoft, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2000, at Cl.
264. See, e.g., id. An unnamed "key Bush advisor" said, "President-elect George W. Bush will drop
the Justice Department's antitrust suit against Microsoft if it wins its appeal in the U.S. Circuit Court next
year." Id.
265. See, e.g., McKEIziE, supra note 126, at xi (noting that the government's claim that there was
"no commercially viable competitor" to Microsoft's operating system did not make a lot of economic
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concern that existing antitrust regulations are too outdated to apply in the modem
economy. Critics of the government also urge that the prosecution has more to do
with pressure by vindictive market rivals than with Microsoft's so-called monopoly
practices.' 7 For Microsoft sympathizers, the antitrust investigation has been a
misguided and wrongheaded attack promoted by jealous competitors' conspiratorial
efforts.' On a more cynical note, some contend that the antitrust investigation is
either driven by misdirected bureaucrats' or pure mean-spiritedness, viciousness,
greed, envy, and retribution for not "coughing up contributions for a host of political
campaigns."' Some commentators simply undercut the government's and Judge
Jackson's views in their entirety, concluding the district court's findings were wrong
on the facts, wrong on the law, and tainted by procedural errors"
On the other hand, many prominent members of the antitrust community support
the government's position in the Microsoft litigation, urging this case as an appropriate
application of antitrust laws in the digital economy!'m Other supporters have been
political.2' Some concluded that the result was an obvious one, given the enormity
of Microsoft's presence in the computer marketplace.""
sense); Charles T. Munger, A Perverse Use of Antitrust Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2000, at A27
(concluding that if Judge Jackson's decision is upheld, "virtually every dominant high-tech business in
the United States will be forced to retreat from what is standard competitive practice"); Lawrence J.
Siskind, The Case Against Microsoft Is Behind the Curve of Technology, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 5, 1998,
at 21 (stating that the Justice Department suffers from institutional myopia and mistakenly views the
technology market as static).
266. See supra Part II.C.I.
267. See MCKENZIE, supra note 126, at xi-xii (concluding that Microsoft's rivals formed a
consortium to pressure the government into throttling Microsoft's competitive advance through antitrust
enforcement). But see William H. Page, Microsoft and the Public Choice Critique of Antitrust,
ANTituT BuLL. 5,46-54 (Spring 1999) (presenting and rejecting the idea that the Microsoft litigation
was merely driven by competitors).
268. See MCKENzIE, supra note 126 (concluding that Microsoft's rivals politicized the process and
that the government essentially did the bidding of these disgruntled competitors).
269. See, e.g., Kenny & Jordan, supra note 123, at 1351 (opening with statement, "Bureaucratic
mission creep can be an insidious process.").
270. MCKENZIE, supra note 126, at 14-16 (attempting to explain the govemment's motivations for
assaulting Microsoft).
271. See, e.g., Robert A. Levy & Alan Reynolds, Microsofts Appealing Case, CATO INST. POL'Y
ANALYSIS no. 385, at 1 (Nov. 9, 2000) (contending that "[t]he Justice Department's case will crumble
as a result of procedural errors, flawed fact-finding, wrongheaded legal conclusions, and Jackson's
preposterous plan to break up the software company").
272. These prominent individuals include
none other than Chicago School Champion Robert Bork who in his role as consultant to
a coalition of Microsoft antagonists has been a forceful supporter of the Government's
Microsoft case. Others responding in like manner are (a) David Boies, distinguished
defense counsel for IBM against the Government's monopolization charges throughout the
1970s but more recently lead counsel for the Government in the Microsoft suit; and (b)
Franklin Fisher, distinguished economist and star expert witness in IBM's defense 25 years
ago more recently now star expert witness for the Government in the Microsoft suit.
Skitol, supra note 16, at 262 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
273. See id. at 262 (citing Senator Orrin Hatch as "strong supporter of the prosecution").
274. See, e.g., Michael A. Hamilton, Power Corrupts: Microsoft Findings Reflect Framers' Fear
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Regardless of one's position on the merits of the antitrust claim, one principal
source of concern has been the nature of the proposed antitrust remedy: the breakup
of Microsoft. Both implicitly and explicitly, the proposed divestiture used the Bell
breakup as a blueprintPs although many contend that the analogy between these two
divestitures does not fit." One concern regarding the proposed remedy is that
consumers would lose in the event of divestiture.' Some commentators have
understandably lacked confidence that the Justice Department and the courts could
fashion an outcome that would actually improve the high-tech markets.m Others
have expressed concern that the district court did not adequately evaluate the economic
ramifications flowing from the divestiture option.' In contrast, those supporting the
government's position endorse the breakup remedy as an appropriate solution to
Microsoft's misconduct.'
of Monopoly, 158 N.J.L.J. 959, 959 (1999) (stating that Judge Jackson simply "stated the obvious" when
he declared Microsoft a monopolist).
275. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4, at 90 (stating that "the Bell breakup has been touted as
the blueprint for Microsoft, so much so that pieces resulting from the company's proposed divestiture
have been dubbed 'Baby Bills' after the 'Baby Bells'"); see also, e.g., Editorial, Open Windows, L.A.
TiMEs, Jan. I1, 1999, at B4 (using "Baby Bills" terminology).
276. The differences between the two breakups would include: AT&T, unlike Microsoft, already
had fairly autonomous divisions at the time of divestiture; unlike AT&T, the Microsoft situation is
"metaphysical," presenting the challenge of separating intellectual property and breaking up company
interests in cyberspace; and Microsoft's software is much more readily duplicated than was AT&T's
phone network. Kalpana Srinivasan, Breakup 101: AT&T Can Offer Lessons, STAR TRiB. (Minneapolis),
June 10, 2000, at DI, D3 (describing how Microsoft and its customers might benefit from AT&T's
mistakes).
277. Steve Chapman, The Real Cost of the Microsoft Verdict, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 2000, at 14,
available at 2000 WL 3653209 ("You have to wonder if maybe, when thq government punishes
[Microsoft], it is putting technological progress and consumer welfare at risk"); Cliff Edwards, Breakup
of Microsoft May Mean Trouble for Consumers, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 3, 2000, at DI, D3
(describing possible industry turmoil and resulting inconvenience to consumers). See generally Lee
Gomes, Economists Debate Merits of Microsoft Breakup Plan, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2000, at A8 (two
economists debate appropriateness of proposed breakup, but agree that prices for consumers will likely
go up following separation).
278. MCKENZiE, supra note 126, at 8 (stating, "I take an even dimmer view of the Justice
Department's ability to fashion remedies" that will improve consumer welfare); see also Lopatka, supra
note 23, at 160 (stating that structural relief is almost always disproportionate to the offense when
monopolization is grounded on predatory behavior).
279. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & David I. Walker, The Overlooked Corporate Finance
Problems of a Microsoft Breakup, 56 Bus. LAw. 459, 462-65 (2001) (highlighting significant breakup
issues that have been overlooked, including the breakups financial complexities); Shelanski & Sidak,
supra note 4, at 90 (concluding in an "Economic Welfare and Divestiture in Microsoft" section that
"neither the absolute nor comparative economic welfare effects of the remedy it adopted, or of any other
remedy before the court, has been sufficiently assessed").
280. One commentator described the remedy as "curiously appropriate," saying:
One could even argue that this old-fashioned remedy is peculiarly fleet and modem.
The alternative, leaving Microsoft intact but under intense government supervision, would
require an army of regulators and an ability to write "conduct orders" covering every
possible development in the software business. That's an impossible handicap in such a
fast-changing industry. Jackson's remedy, by contrast, creates two rivals that will police
each other - with help from other companies - through simple forces of competition.
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Many diverse potential legal ramifications flow from the Microsoft decision.
Because Judge Jackson condemned the act of technological integration as an illegal
tying arrangement, high-tech firms naturally fear the risks attendant to "technological
tying.""' Because innovation in many technology markets often follows a model
similar to the Microsoft story, and the legal outcome on this tying issue could
ultimately transform how high-tech companies develop and market their products.!'
Regardless of the ultimate holding, commentators agree that the Microsoft case will
undoubtedly have a lasting impact' and that the price tag has been hefty.'4 As
for Microsoft itself, the antitrust saga is far from over, regardless of whether it wins
or loses its current appeal. The company continues to make bold statements eliciting
responses from antitrust regulators.'
V. Old Problems, New Challenges: Meeting the Next Thousand Years
A. Relevance of Antitrust Regulation in the New Millennium
Modem commentators moan and groan that old-fashioned antitrust approaches
have lost relevance in the "new economy."' In essence, antitrust experts complain
Editorial, Breaking Up Microsoft: A Curiously Appropriate Remedy, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 11.
2000, at A18 [hereinafter Editorial, Breaking Up Microsoft].
281. M. Sean Royall, Coping with the Antitrust Risks of Technological Integration, 68 ANTmTRusT
LJ. 1023, 1023 (2001). Royall concludes that Judge Jackson's approach poses a materially greater risk
that technological integration decisions will be increasingly scrutinized as antitrust tying claims. Id. at
1050.
282. Id. at 1023 (noting that technological integration often is the essence of what makes high-tech
products better).
283. As two commentators recently noted:
Appeals courts may or may not uphold Judge Jackson's findings of fact or his
conclusions of law. The penalties, or "remedies," he handed down may or may not ever
actually be imposed on the company. But even now it is clear that the very fact of the
trial, the months of unflattering scrutiny of this industry giant, have already changed the
rules for Microsoft and for much of the computer industry.
BRINKLEY & LOHR, supra note 199, at xiv; see also J. Bradford De Long, Is Big Bad?, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
9, 2000, at MI (noting that the Microsoft decision could "wind up as a footnote," but that it should
represent "a big step down the path of applying antitrust principles more than a century old to the new
economy").
284. Through September 2000, the expenses associated with the Microsoft matter included an
estimated $35 million spent by the Justice Department and at least $100 billion lost by Microsoft
shareholders. See Mark Schmidt, Who Picks Up the Legal Tab?, WAsH. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2000, at A17
(complaining about the legal fees demanded by the nineteen state attorneys general who joined the suit
by the Justice Department).
285. In March 2001, Microsoft unveiled "HailStorm," an ambitious new array of Interet services,
including a massive database that will help consumers manage and share personal information online.
This announcement raised new regulatory concerns among antitrust enforcers and industry groups.
Rebecca Buckman, Microsoft Unveils "HailStorm" Internet Initiative, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20,2001, at B7
(quoting the attorney general of Connecticut, who said that Microsoft's announcement "appears to raise
serious questions"); Alec Klein, Microsoft Strategy Focuses on Web, WASH. PoST, Mar. 20,2001, at El
(noting the concern among government regulators and Microsoft's rivals "that the software giant is again
testing antitrust laws").
286. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 28, at 925 (concluding that antitrust doctrine is "supple enough"
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that the century-old Sherman Act cannot address the dynamic market developments
of the new millennium.m Of course, the age of a particular regulation alone is not
particularly meaningful.' In fact, in its most basic form, competitive misconduct
seems constant over time.'
These oft-stated concerns regarding old-fashioned antitrust laws miss the mark.
The real obsolescence issue is whether antitrust law's core principles remain viable
in today's fast-changing commercial context. Although some contend that the world
has fundamentally changed in ways that demand a wholly new framework for
antitrust enforcement, there is no need to overhaul the statutory foundation
because the statutes are fluid enough to protect competition, the essence of antitrust
doctrine. The Sherman Act and its companion regulations are beautiful in their
sparse simplicity."' The interpretation of competition protection has largely been
left in the hands of judges and regulators, who have relied over time on economists'
analyses of how competition operates in particular markets and, correspondingly, on
popular perceptions of what competition protection means. When economic theory
defined competition protection almost exclusively in terms of allocative efficiency,
antitrust enforcement retreated to let market forces naturally regulate competitive
pressures.' When the courts moved to define consumer welfare more broadly,
judicial decisions and regulatory trends adjusted accordingly. 3
to apply in the new economy, but that the enforcement agencies and the courts are not flexible enough
to cope).
287. Last year, a New York imes editorial succinctly presented the problem this way: "Can, and
should, laws designed to manage the emergence of industrial and natural resource monopolies in the late
19th and early 20th Centuries be applied to the technology and intellectual property giants of the 21st
Century?" Editorial, The Remedy for Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2000, at A22; see also Pitofsky,
supra note 7, at 913 (describing increasing concerns about the Sherman Act being unable to "keep up");
Posner, supra note 28, at 925 (noting the argument that doctrines "developed to deal with competition
and monopoly in smokestack industries" cannot deal with "the dynamic economy of the 21st century").
288. After all, the First Amendment is not "too old-fashioned" to address modem Interet and cable
television means of communication, which vary so dramatically from the distribution of Federalist
pamphlets hundreds of years ago. See Pitofsky, supra note 7. at 913-14 (noting the First Amendment
analogy as support for the position that age should not undercut the Sherman Act).
289. In the Microsoft context, it has been argued that even high-tech misconduct is the same as
smokestack era bullying:
During the course of the long Microsoft trial it was often said that federal antitrust law
is obsolete, that statutes drawn up in the smokestack era are irrelevant in the digital age.
But the old-fashioned remedy approved last week by Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson
seems curiously appropriate - both to Microsoft's bullying tactics in recent years and to
enforcement of healthy competition in the future.... Although Microsoft competes in a
business as new as tomorrow, it was accused of activities that are as old as capitalism
itself.
Editorial, Breaking Up Microsoft, supra note 280, at AI8.
290. See, e.g., Minda, supra note 2, at 1776 ("Antitrust law needs a new framework and justification
for responding to the political, social, and economic conditions that are now shaping the emerging
postindustrial marketplace.").
291. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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The marketplace has changed dramatically since antitrust law's birth. Thus,
antitrust policy that focuses upon the market as a static concept would misconstrue
the practical reality of how it functions, thereby hurting consumers in the long run.
To the extent today's network industries reflect rapid innovation, the economic
analyses of network externalities and creative destruction both have valid
application, but would yield very different results.' This does not mean that
either approach is incorrect; instead, modem antitrust analysis must take into
account the logical application of both perspectives. Moreover, the world's
marketplace today does not consist solely of high-tech industries; it consists of a
blended mix of industries moving steadily toward informational services, but
mundane products have not been left behind. As different market contexts demand
varying definitions of competition and consumer welfare, the flexible application of
antitrust regulation should recognize and accommodate these differences. In the end,
the relationship between market structure and high-tech innovation is important and
extremely difficult to analyze. One takes a significant first step by acknowledging
that static concepts will not adequately explain a dynamic market.' 5 Over time,
intellectual attitudes toward what constitutes market concentration has changed, and
antitrust enforcement and case authorities attempt to mirror these changes.' At
the very least, prominent members of the antitrust community urge heightened
antitrust scrutiny for modem industries to ensure that private market power does not
compromise economic growth, and Congress may very well accept that suggestion.'
294. Two commentators have recently described the significance of this interaction in the following
way:
The adoption of one or the other of those frameworks can be of great practical
consequence. High profit margins might appear to be the benign and necessary recovery
of legitimate investment returns in [an innovation-based] framework, but they might
represent exploitation of customer lock-in and monopoly power when viewed through the
lens of network economics. Market dominance in the former case is likely to be
temporary, but in the latter to become entrenched. The issue is particularly complex
because, in network industries characterized by rapid innovation, both forces may be
operating and can be difficult to isolate. Neither the [innovation-based) nor the network
externalities framework justifies anticompetitive behavior, but each might yield different
conclusions about what constitutes evidence of such behavior and what the likely
consequences of such behavior will be, These factors are, in turn, directly relevant to the
choice of an appropriate remedy where antitrust violations have occurred.
Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 4, at 6-7. It is also important to note that innovation-based economic
theories originated more than half a century ago, long before Microsoft ever appeared on the scene.
295. Id. at 29 ("For current purposes ... the important fact is that such a debate exists, as does
consensus that the relationship is likely to depend heavily on firm - and industry - specific factors.").
296. See Kovacic, supra note 26 (analyzing historic changes in intellectual attitudes).
297. FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky and a staff colleague have described this need for heightened
antitrust scrutiny. See David Balto & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and High Tech Industries: The New
Challenge, ANTITRUsT BULL. 583, 583-85 (1998) (noting that high-tech industries make competition
different, and that the differences require more antitrust intervention).
298. A serious review of the current regulatory structure may be in the offing. House Judiciary
Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner announced last March that he was preparing a bill that would create
an antitrust modernization commission to study whether the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act should
be updated. The major focus areas would be the effects of globalization, intellectual property, and state
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B. Protracted Litigation and Big-Case Management
The current antitrust debate frequently centers on the special problems surroun-
ding massive litigation. It is undisputed that antitrust cases, by their very nature, are
often complex, necessarily implicating extensive discovery and years of detailed
economic and regulatory analysis. The "big-case" problem has at least two
components. First, the sheer size of such actions results in a meaningful draw on
resources with very significant transactional costs. Second, the protracted nature of
such investigations in a fast-changing competitive environment makes antitrust
enforcement problematic at best.
On the first point, complex litigation is certainly not unique to antitrust. Although
it is unfortunate that large, sophisticated matters drain regulatory and judicial
resources, one cannot abandon legitimate enforcement efforts for that reason.
Moreover, big antitrust cases are certainly not confined to the Microsoft experience;
all-consuming enforcement actions date back to the days of Standard Oil.'
As for the protracted nature of antitrust enforcement, the government and the
courts undoubtedly lack adequate technical resources and clearly move too slowly
to effectively handle today's rapidly evolving markets.' The complexities of high-
tech inventions exacerbate this institutional slowness; jurists and the legal system
adapt only slowly to new technology.' Time's passage may render any pending
antitrust litigation obsolete. °3 At the very least, such delays can adversely affect
business planning and make investment riskier.' In addition, antitrust litigation's
intervention. Sensenbrenner: Antitrust Overhaul Due, supra note 14 (describing proposed bill).
299. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
300. In fact, this is the conclusion reached by Richard Posner. Posner, supra note 28, at 925
(concluding that the "real problem lies on the institutional side").
301. Richard Posner calls this "mismatch between law time and new-economy real time" troubling,
saying:
[Aln antitrust case involving a new-economy firm may drag on for so long relative to the
changing conditions of the industry as to become irrelevant, ineffectual. That was a
problem even in the old economy. One recalls, for example, that by the time the
monopolization case against Alcoa completed its journey through the courts, Alcoa had
lost its monopoly for reasons unrelated to the litigation; as a result, the decree finally
entered against Alcoa offered little more than nominal relief (the divestiture of Alcoa's
Canadian subsidiary, a substantial producer but one which U.S. tariffs prevented from
having a big impact on the U.S. market). This type of problem is likely to be more
frequent in the new economy.
Id. at 939 (footnote omitted).
302. Drater, supra note 18, at 671-72 (noting that "analogies are the gold out of which the common
law must be refined" when applying antitrust principles to high-tech competitors because the marketplace
moves much faster than courts and cases).
303. This concern has special emphasis with respect to the largest antitrust investigations. See supra
Part IV.
304. Posner, supra note 28, at 939 (reasoning that pending of lengthy antitrust litigation "may cast
a pall over parties to and affected by the litigation").
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tendency to spawn multiple suits can make a bad situation even worse.'
Delay is inefficient, but it certainly does not debilitate the effective application
of antitrust enforcement, especially given the complex nature of market analysis and
the interpretation of competition protection. For one thing, time gives the courts and
agencies the opportunity to absorb, analyze, and digest changes in markets and
technology rather than jumping to hasty, inappropriate conclusions. In a dynamic
environment, it is better to encourage regulatory systems to make well-reasoned
evaluations. To the extent an evolving market environment changes an antitrust
defendant's market status, as was apparently the case with IBM, the government and
the court can properly adjust the enforcement action to take those changes into
account. The very slowness of the process in a rapidly changing environment
enables the regulatory system to correct itself before issuing a final assessment.
Comparing the Microsoft, IBM, and AT&T experiences instructs antitrust
analyses in several respects. On one level, the comparison demonstrates that today's
high-tech field is not sui generis; in fact, the AT&T breakup has been cited as an
example of how innovation will thrive when competition is present in a high-tech
context. ' Both AT&T and IBM mirror Microsoft in significant ways in terms of
underlying antitrust issues and the investigations' size, complexity, and duration.
Although substantial debate remains regarding the effect of the AT&T divestiture,
most agree that the divestiture has yielded a procompetitive effect.' As for IBM,
the ultimate dismissal was the appropriate result and demonstrates that government
regulators can, in the end, acknowledge changing economic conditions and market
analyses. The IBM debacle did drain significant resources; yet, the antitrust target
raised dangerous possibilities at the time the government brought the investigation,
and then its changed market position warranted the suit's discontinuance by the time
of dismissal.
Microsoft, in contrast, has provided a relatively efficient example of antitrust
litigation; ironically, its key legacy may be procedural.' Despite Judge Jackson's
other frailties, ' the Microsoft litigation has been viewed as relatively punctual
establishing a new paradigm for complex antitrust litigation. '
305. Richard Posner calls this the "cluster-bomb effect":
No sooner does the Antitrust Division bring a case, but the states, and now the European
Union, are likely to join the fray, followed at a distance by the antitrust plaintiffs' class-
action bar. The effect is to lengthen the original lawsuit, complicate settlement, magnify
and protract the uncertainty engendered by the litigation, and increase litigation costs.
Id. at 940.
306. See Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 918-19 (giving the AT&T breakup as an example demonstrating
a meaningful link between innovation and competition).
307. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
308. Gavil, supra note 226, at 13 (noting that in "the final analysis, Microsfl's procedural course
may be among its most enduring legacies").
309. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
310. One commentator describes the district court's handling as "remarkable" to the extent that it
"took full advantage of a century of procedural innovations to sidestep the dreary option of protracted
litigation." Gavil, supra note 226, at 13 (also commenting that Judge Jackson's measures were "antidotes
to unstructured, unruly, costly, and prolonged trench warfare"); see also Lopatka, supra note 23, at 161
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In any event, many possible strategies exist to address the institutional difficulties
inherent in bringing complex antitrust investigations and suits. These include
creating a specialized court to handle technical matters, " ' limiting the states' rights
to bring antitrust suits,"' and exclusively empowering the Department of Justice
to bring antitrust suits for damages to be distributed among private victims (thereby
preempting subsequent state and/or private suits). 3 On a less ambitious level, the
institutional problems could be ameliorated simply through better resources and
training, although these improvements create separate issues.3 4 Although room for
improvement always exists in any regulatory area, the Microsoft case appears to
demonstrate that antitrust enforcement functions relatively well in a dynamic market
and that the big-case context does not harmfully distract from the core principles of
antitrust law.
C. What the Future Holds: Antitrust Excitement in the Next Thousand Years
Fifteen years ago, no one would have linked "antitrust" and "excitement" in the
same sentence. Today, largely as a result of the focus afforded by the Microsoft
case and by increased merger and enforcement levels, antitrust law is on the move
and presents exciting possibilities in the new millennium.
It is naturally difficult to predict with certainty the future direction of competition
protection. Antitrust law has ebbed and flowed over the years, and there is nothing
surprising about witnessing a natural movement in the fortunes of a substantive
legal area. Indeed, corporate law generally maintains a relatively stable equilibrium,
regardless of the underlying pressures in the surrounding legal contexts."' In order
(noting that the Antitrust Division and the judge avoided the lengthy IBM "travesty" in Microsoft).
311. Some criticize this suggestion on the grounds that any technical training would likely become
out of date fairly quickly "unless we are to have a system in which the regulation of the new economy
is entrusted to twenty-five-year-old judges, lawyers, and engineers." Posner, supra note 28, at 940
(characterizing the suggestion as "distinctly unpromising").
312. lt at 940-41 (criticizing the ability of state attorneys general to bring adequate resources and
skills to antitrust inquiries).
313. Id. at 941 (describing this "possible, partial solution to the delay and cluster-bomb problems").
Certain government agencies, such as the Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission, already enjoy such power. Id. at 941-42.
314. As one commentator has noted:
As minor palliatives, I would like to see greater use of neutral experts ... and I would
also like the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission to be given the
necessary appropriations to enable each of these agencies to hire a competent technical
staff. That won't be easy, given the salaries that competent new-economy scientists and
engineers command in the private market. But there is a more serious problem, and that
is the rapid obsolescence of technical knowledge, which, combined with tenure practices
in government agencies, may prevent the agencies from maintaining a technical staff that
is actually abreast of current technology.
Id. at 940 (footnote omitted).
315. For an overview of how the changing forces in securities law, mergers regulation, and
management's fiduciary obligations tend to achieve a workable balance in corporate governance, see
Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First Century, 21 1. CORP.
L. 417,454-55 (1996) (concluding that despite the "actions and reactions across the diverse legal contexts
over the past decade, an equilibrium should balance effective governance" and that "corporate governance
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to ascertain how antitrust enforcement will evolve in the coming years, one must
appreciate what forces have moved competition regulation since the very beginning.
Commentators cannot clearly articulate the factors that govern antitrust's fortunes.
Some believe that the controlling factors are largely political."6 More likely, the
economy, economic theory, and popular perceptions of competition protection
control antitrust enforcement levels. With respect to the economy, its relevance is
obvious. When the national economy is crippled - as during the Great Depres-
sion - antitrust enforcement takes a back seat to other considerations. Competition
is beside the point when business survival is at stake. Today, "It's the economy,
stupid," and the country is currently in the grips of an economic slowdown, if not
a major economic downturn." 7 As the economy fluctuates domestically and
abroad, it affects merger activity.. and can directly affect the need for antitrust
regulation.
Even more important, antitrust enforcement trends turn on how economists
evaluate the operation of competitive markets. During the first half of the twentieth
century, there was little meaningful economic analysis of market operations. With
the growth of the Chicago School, however, courts and regulators increasingly
turned to allocative efficiency arguments when construing competition protec-
tion. " ' As a result, the legal and economic communities made a philosophical
determination that market forces could most often control competition problems
except in the most extreme circumstances; this approach naturally yielded very
limited enforcement levels.' Through the 1990s, the courts and regulators have
started to construe the consumer-welfare purpose of antitrust more broadly than
allocative efficiency, and this has generated higher levels of antitrust activity.
Finally, as for the popular conception of antitrust enforcement, current views
appear rather centrist in approach. Rather than running from the evils of "big
business" or wholly embracing the regenerative powers of an unfettered
marketplace, antitrust regulation today appears to fall somewhere in the middle.
George W. Bush's nominations for antitrust regulators are consistent with this
centrist approach,32' and future trends will likely continue in a similar vein. Thus,
in important respects, antitrust law is not just getting older - it's getting better,
reflecting a more sophisticated and balanced approach to competition analysis and
regulation.
is working").
316. See generally supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
317. "It's the economy, stupid" was the four-word "mantra" used by Bill Clinton to take the
presidency from George Bush, Sr., in 1992. Steven Pearlstein, Downturn a SurprLve for New Economy,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 24, 2000, at Al (describing Clinton's campaign slogan and discussing George W.
Bush's current economic difficulties).
318. The financial crises abroad in the late 1990s put a damper on globalization. Tim Smart,
Globalization Goes Awry; Hurt by Economic Turmoil, MultinationaLT Retreat, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1998,
at G I (describing the peril of globalization in an economic downturn).
319. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
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VL Conclusion
After many years of dormancy, antitrust law is back in fashion. The Microsoft
controversy has prodded antitrust enforcement from sleepy complacency. Now 110
years old, antitrust doctrines designed to protect the industrial revolution
marketplace from unfair competition may be an anachronism in the computer age.
Thus, the hard questions are being asked.
At the beginning of this article, a quote likened market competitors to frogs."
The pond has changed remarkably since 1890; still, the basics driving competition
remain the same in fundamental respects. Consumers want fair choices, and
business rivals want to operate in a competitively appropriate environment. Antitrust
law provides a relatively simplistic statutory structure that will flexibly accom-
modate various judicial and regulatory constructions as the world's marketplaces
change over time. The economic framework for analyzing fair competition may
vary over time. That moving analytical structure helps to assure that antitrust
enforcement will stay current even as the pond waters shift and surge in surprising
ways.
Microsoft's big case context only underscores these conclusions. In important
ways, the Microsoft experience highlights the greatest challenges in modem antitrust
enforcement. The controversy presents an enormously successful frog, swimming
in a dynamic, high-tech environment. Microsoft's marketing demonstrates
technological tying of the sort that could well provide the blueprint for comparable
software designers and manufacturers. At the same time, the relevant market's
network effects are undeniable. The relevant definition of competition protection in
this setting paves the way for antitrust's future in the new millennium.
On balance, antitrust law will become even more important in years to come.
Enforcement levels will fluctuate, largely to accommodate the changing fortunes of
the world's economies. Globalization will similarly continue in fits and starts, with
international mergers and the growth of cross-national competition regulation as
prominent features. In this stimulating environment, the need for competition
protection is stronger than ever; the fragile, fluctuating economy simply does not
support the conclusion that dynamic market forces alone can police unreasonable
trade restraints. That being the case, antitrust regulation flexibly protects com-
petition now even better than before, although the application can be unwieldy and
difficult. Antitrust excitement is accordingly here to stay, motivating competitive
frogs to new heights in the twenty-first century.
322. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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